UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA
JOURNAL of LAW & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Vol. 6

November 2020

No. 1

FIXING THE JOHNSON AMENDMENT WITHOUT
TOTALLY DESTROYING IT
Benjamin M. Leff*
The so-called Johnson Amendment is that portion of Section 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code that prohibits charities from "intervening" in
electoral campaigns. Intervention has long been understood to include both
contributing charitable funds to campaign coffers and communicating the
charity's views about candidates' qualifications for office. The breadth of the
Johnson Amendment potentially brings two important values into conflict:
the government's interest in preventing tax-deductible contributions to be
used for electoral purposes (called “nonsubvention”) and the speech rights
or interests of charities.
For many years, the IRS has taken the position that the Johnson
Amendment's prohibition on electoral communications includes the content
of a religious leader's speech in an official religious service -- a minister may
not express support or opposition to a candidate from the pulpit. For at least
as many years, some commentators and legislators have found this
application of the Johnson Amendment especially problematic, since it
implicates directly the freedom of houses of worship speech and religious
exercise. These Johnson Amendment critics sought to provide some carveout from the Johnson Amendment's general application to permit speech that
includes ministers' pulpit speech without creating a massive loophole for the
Johnson Amendment's general prohibition on campaign intervention. Other
commentators have long argued that a limited carve-out for certain types of
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speech is not possible—that permitting any communication of the
organization's views, even in pulpit speech, would provide too large a loophole
in the overall treatment of campaign contributions and expenditures.
This Article reviews the leading proposals to fix the Johnson
Amendment, and finds them all lacking. It then proposes four types of
modifications that could be used to properly balance the speech interests of
charities (including churches) with the government’s interest in a level
playing field for campaign expenditures (nonsubvention). These proposed
modifications include: (i) a non-incremental expenditure tax, (ii) a reporting
regime, (iii) a disclosure regime, and (iv) a governance regime. The Article
concludes that in order to properly balance nonsubvention with speech
interests of charities, a modification of the Johnson Amendment should
include some version of all four types of interventions.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been a lot of attention to the so-called Johnson Amendment
lately, and, actually, for a long time. The Johnson Amendment is the portion
of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code that conditions
qualification for tax-exempt status on an organization refraining from
participating or intervening in any campaign for public office. 1 It is what I
have previously called the “Campaign Intervention Ban.”2 The Johnson
Amendment has two very different kinds of effects. First, it levels the
campaign finance playing field by preventing donors from receiving a tax
deduction by passing their campaign finance contribution through a 501(c)(3)
organization when they could not get a tax deduction for a campaign
contribution in any other context. But, second, it impacts the speech engaged
in by charities and their leaders, sometimes in ways that arguably have little to
do with tax-deductible contributions or tax exemption. For example, according
to guidance from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), it prevents leaders of
501(c)(3) organizations, including ministers, from indicating a view about

See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (defining an eligible entity as one “which does not participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office”); see also I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D)
(noting that a “charitable contribution” is one for use of a corporation “which does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office”).
2
Benjamin M. Leff, “Sit Down and Count the Cost”: A Framework for Constitutionally
Enforcing the 501(c)(3) Campaign Intervention Ban, 28 VA. TAX REV. 673, 675 (2009). In
the present Article, I use the terms “Johnson Amendment” or “prohibition” to mean the same
thing as “Campaign Intervention Ban.”
1
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which candidate is preferable in any campaign for public office at any official
function or publication of the organization, including from the pulpit. 3
For a long time, the very specific application of the Johnson
Amendment to religious leaders’ speech during a worship service has been
the source of a great deal of the attention, generating strong political
opposition to the Johnson Amendment’s application in this context. Donald
Trump repeatedly vowed to “totally destroy” the Johnson Amendment early
in his presidency4 and appeared to believe he was doing so by issuing an
executive order on May 4, 2017.5 Legislation to change it has been proposed
for decades, often targeting violations like the one that would be implicated
if a minister sought to influence voters from their pulpit. 6 Most recently, in
the 116th Congress, Representative Steve Scalise and Senator James
Langford introduced The Free Speech Fairness Act of 2019 (FSFA), which
would cut a narrow(ish) exception to the Johnson Amendment for any
statement “made in the ordinary course of the organization’s regular and
customary activities” for which the organization does not incur “more than
de minimis incremental expenses.”7 The FSFA has never been enacted, but
on November 16th, 2017, the House passed tax reform legislation (The Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act), which contained a modification of the Johnson
3

See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421 (stating that leaders of 501(c)(3) organizations,
such as ministers, “cannot make partisan comments . . . at official functions of the
organizations.”).
4
E.g., Remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1, at 3 (Feb.
2, 2017).
5
Exec. Order No. 13,798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,675 (May 4, 2017); see Salvador Rizzo, President
Trump’s Shifting Claim that ‘We Got Rid’ of the Johnson Amendment, WASH. POST (May 9,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/09/president-trumps-shifting-claimthat-we-got-rid-johnson-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/38T7-3RTY]) (asserting that Trump
claimed to dispose of the Johnson Amendment after signing an Executive Order in May 2017
“with the stated purpose of giving more leeway to religious groups in the realm of political
speech”); see also Ellen P. Aprill, Amending the Johnson Amendment in the Age of Cheap
Speech, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 4–5 (2018) (describing the dissonance between the text
of the Executive Order and the statements made by President Trump when he signed it);
Benjamin Leff, Trump’s Johnson Amendment Executive Order Does Not Say What He Said It
Said, SURLY SUBGROUP BLOG (May 4, 2017), https://surlysubgroup.com/2017/05/04/trumpsjohnson-amendment-executive-order-does-not-say-what-he-said-it-said/ [https://perma.cc/5Q2K693U] (detailing the contrast between Trump’s remarks on multiple occasions and the
potential impacts of the Executive Order).
6
For a list of bills introduced between 2001 and 2007, see Leff, supra note 2, at 679 n.11.
Of the nine bills listed there, all but one provides special carveouts for religious organizations
or houses of worship. See also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits,
Substantial Burdens, and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1141 n.16 (2009)
(relaying the rejection of the Houses of Worship Political Speech Act and like proposals).
7
H.R. 949, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019). The Bill was introduced by Rep. Steve Scalise (R-LA)
and has 39 co-sponsors. An identical bill was introduced in the Senate by Sen. James
Lankford (R-OK). See S. 330, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019) (containing identical provisions).
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Amendment that is very similar to the FSFA, 8 but in the final version of the
law the provision was removed. 9 In addition to reform legislation meant to
modify but not eradicate the Johnson Amendment, as recently as 2017
legislation was proposed to repeal the Johnson Amendment entirely. 10
Some citizen activists have sought to effectively repeal the
prohibition without Congressional action, including a group of ministers who
have been publicly violating the Johnson Amendment by endorsing
candidates from their pulpits on what they have been calling “Pulpit Freedom
Sunday.”11 Many of them then send transcripts or videotapes of their
violations to the IRS, presumably seeking IRS enforcement that would enable
them to test the constitutionality of the Johnson Amendment in court, but the
IRS has to date not made public any enforcement against these groups. 12
Supporters of the Johnson Amendment also have been active and are at
least as certain of the provision’s importance as its detractors are of its venality.13
For example, Professor Roger Colinvaux, one of the leading experts on the
provision, has stated that if Congress passed a bill like the FSFA, relaxing
but not repealing the Johnson Amendment, “partisan politics would
overtake the nonprofit world, casting institutions designed to promote the
8

See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 5201 (as passed by the House in amended form, Nov. 16, 2017)
(proposing to permit a tax-exempt organization to make certain statements related to a
political campaign without losing its tax-exempt status).
9
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). See Aprill, supra note 5, at 2 n.4 (“The final legislation
did not include any amendment to the Johnson Amendment. The Democrats persuaded the Senate
parliamentarian that the amendment of the Johnson Amendment had to be removed from the
legislation because it violated a provision . . . known as the Byrd Rule.”) (citation omitted).
10
H.R. 172, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017).
11
See Pulpit Initiative | Pulpit Freedom Sunday, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM (Feb. 5,
2019), http://www.adfmedia.org/news/prdetail/4360 [perma.cc/GSU3-3Y97] (“Pulpit
Freedom Sunday is an event associated with the Pulpit Initiative, a legal effort designed to
secure the free speech rights of pastors in the pulpit.”). For a discussion of Pulpit Freedom
Sunday, see Samuel D. Brunson, Dear IRS, It Is Time to Enforce the Campaigning
Prohibition. Even Against Churches, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 143, 145 (2016).
12
Between 2004 and 2008 the IRS ran the Political Activity Compliance Initiative (PACI),
which sought to investigate violations of the Johnson Amendment and to use the
investigations to educate the public about its limits. But, since then, the IRS has been silent
about such violations. See, e.g., Memorandum from Michael R. Phillips, Deputy Inspector
General for Audit, to Commissioner, Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division,
Improvements Have Been Made to Educate Tax-Exempt Organizations and Enforce the
Prohibition Against Political Activities, but Further Improvements Are Possible (June 18,
2008), (available at https://www.treasury.gov/Tigta/auditreports/2008reports/200810117fr.html
[https:// perma.cc/Y22P-JYHF]) (providing no mention of Johnson Amendment violations).
13
See, e.g., Brendan Fischer, Destroying the Johnson Amendment: How Allowing Charities
to Spend on Politics Would Flood the Swamp That President Trump Promised to Drain,
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (May 3, 2017), https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/John
son%20Amendment%20White%20Paper_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q23Y-VKW3] (highlighting
the arguments against letting 501(c)(3) non-profits participate in political campaign activities).
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public good into the depraved den of identity politics and selfish motives.” 14
He predicts “devastating results for charities and democracy” and calls this
“a seismic moment.”15
The remarkable thing about the partisan divide over the Johnson
Amendment is that while the rhetoric is extreme, it is not clear that the
distance between the camps is very far apart. As mentioned above, the
Johnson Amendment arguably does two distinct things: (i) first, it prevents
political contributors from using charities to obtain a tax deduction for their
political campaign contributions, a deduction that is not available under
(almost) any other circumstance. Almost everyone (even Senator Charles
Grassley, a voluble Johnson Amendment critic) agrees that it would be a bad
idea to permit political campaign contributions to flow through charities,
permitting donors a tax deduction that they would not be able to get if they
supported candidates in any other way. 16 This goal of the Johnson
Amendment is sometimes called the “nonsubvention principle” 17 because it
prevents 501(c)(3) organizations from using the government subsidy implicit
in tax exemption and tax-deductible charitable contributions for electoral
purposes. There is widespread consensus that this aspect of the Johnson

14

Roger Colinvaux, Opinion, The House Tax Bill Could Be the End of Charities as We Know
Them, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/
the-house-tax-bill-could-be-the-end-of-charities-as-we-know-them/ [https://perma.cc/9SSDKRMR]; see also E-mail from Milton Cerny, Esq., to Paul Streckfus, Editor, EO Tax Journal
(Jul. 25, 2016), in Paul Streckfus, The EOTJ Mailbag, EO TAX J. 2016-142 (“[O]nce you
allow charities to engage in political campaigns you create a cancer on the sector.”).
15
Colinvaux, supra note 14. See also Ellen P. Aprill, Why the IRS Should Want to Develop
Rules Regarding Charities and Politics, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 652 (2012) (noting
that, without the additional threat of revocation of 501(c)(3) status, an excise tax would not
effectively deter an organization from engaging in political campaign intervention if this
intervention required little out-of-pocket expense); Roger Colinvaux, The Political Speech
of Charities in the Face of Citizens United: A Defense of Prohibition, 62 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 685, 756 (2012) (stressing that the benefits of loosening the prohibition on political
intervention are not obvious, while the benefits of retaining the prohibition—specifically, “a
charitable sector that is noble in purpose and free of partisan rancor”—are evident).
16
Senator Grassley reportedly said, “There was some indication in the press, I don’t know
whether it’s the way the Johnson Amendment actually works so give me this leeway, but if it
allows the use of church contributions to promote candidates, I think that goes too far.” Senator
Charles Grassley, Remarks at the Floyd County Courthouse (Feb. 23, 2017), in Paul Streckfus,
FFRF Argues for Retention of Johnson Amendment, EO TAX J. 2017-97 (May 17, 2017).
17
This principle is explained (without using the term “subvention”) in Regan v. Taxation
With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (“We have held in several
contexts that a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does
not infringe the right . . . .”). See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 5, at 10 (“[T]he ‘no duty to pay’
rationale [is] often dubbed the nonsubvention principle . . . .”).
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Amendment should be preserved. 18 But, (ii) second, the Johnson Amendment
also prevents charities from expressing their own views on the qualifications
of candidates for office, and leaders of charities from expressing their
personal views under circumstances in which these views could be attributed
to the organization. Both spending or donating money and expressing the
organization’s view are considered “political campaign activity” by the
IRS.19 It is this second effect of the Johnson Amendment that is causing the
partisan divide, since some commentators (mainly on the political right)
believe that this component of the Johnson Amendment infringes on the
speech rights of charitable actors, especially religious leaders speaking to
their own congregations.20
A few quick examples might be helpful to understand the difference
between the nonsubvention principle, which almost everyone wants to
maintain, and the free speech and exercise values that Johnson Amendment
critics want to foster. If Ben Leff, who is so rich that he is in the top federal
income tax bracket of 37% in 2020, wants to support a candidate for
president, he can contribute to the candidate’s campaign, which under current
law has no effect on his taxable income. Or, if there was no Johnson
Amendment, he could contribute $1,000 to the charity of his choice (for
example, the Benjamin Leff Donor-Advised Fund at Vanguard Charitable, a
501(c)(3) charity), and then the charity could contribute the funds to the
candidate. Leff would take a deduction of the $1,000 charitable contribution
See, e.g., COMM’N ON ACCOUNTABILITY & POL’Y FOR RELIGIOUS ORG., GOVERNMENT
REGULATION OF POLITICAL SPEECH BY RELIGIOUS AND OTHER 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS:
WHY THE STATUS QUO IS UNTENABLE AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 5 (2013) [hereinafter
CAPRO REPORT] (“[T]here is a high level of agreement among Commission and Panel
members that permitting the disbursement of funds by tax-exempt religious and other
501(c)(3) organizations for political campaign activities could have a deleterious impact on
the effectiveness of the nonprofit sector.”).
19
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CAT. NO. 11283J, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990 RETURN
OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 69 (2019) (“All activities that support or
oppose candidates for elective federal, state, or local public office. It doesn’t matter whether
the candidate is elected. A candidate is one who offers himself or is proposed by others for
public office. Political campaign activity doesn’t include any activity to encourage
participation in the electoral process, such as voter registration or voter education, provided
that the activity doesn’t directly or indirectly support or oppose any candidate.”).
20
See, e.g., CAPRO REPORT, supra note 18, at 4 (“[A] member of the clergy should be
permitted to say whatever he or she believes is appropriate in the context of a religious
worship service without fear of government reprisal, even when such communications
include content related to political candidates.”); see also E-mail from Mike Batts, Managing
Partner, Batts Morrison Wales & Lee, to Paul Streckfus, Editor, EO Tax Journal (Jul. 27,
2016), in Paul Streckfus, The EOTJ Mailbag, EO TAX J. 2016-144 (“The content of a sermon
or religious worship service embodies these [core First Amendment] rights like virtually
nothing else . . . . A law that permits US government officials to monitor and evaluate the
content of a minister’s sermons to determine whether such content is permissible is inherently
problematic. It is hard to imagine any law that is more of an affront to the First Amendment.”).
18

122

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[Nov. 2020

(reducing his taxes by $370), and his out-of-pocket cost for his $1,000
contribution would be only $630; the candidate would get the full $1,000.
The $370 savings is “subvention,” because the US government effectively
subsidizes Leff’s political contribution by permitting Leff to reduce his taxes
by making a charitable contribution that is then used to support his candidate.
A million-dollar contribution gives him $370,000 worth of “subvention.”
Even without subvention, our campaign finance laws permit billionaires to
exert an impressive amount of influence over our elections. Permitting
subvention—a subsidy from the federal government supplementing their
donations—would distort the campaign finance playing field even more.
If, rather than pass the $1,000 contribution on to a candidate, the
charity uses the money to buy its own advertisement in a newspaper that says
“vote for candidate X” (the candidate Leff supports), it is clear that there is
still “subvention” because the cost of campaign-related speech is subsidized
by the charitable deduction. But what if we imagine a charitable leader
speaking at a regular meeting of their organization, like a minister preaching
at a church worship service? Here, no “incremental funds” are spent on the
speech because the leader would be speaking to the community at that time
even if they weren’t speaking about a candidate. In that case, it might appear
that there is no subvention, or at least that subvention is not a serious concern
in light of the value of the speech of charities, especially churches. Under
current law, charities are prohibited from engaging in a wide range of
activities that might communicate their or their donors’ views with respect to
a candidate regardless of whether they incur incremental costs. 21 In effect,
the law holds that a charity cannot support or oppose a candidate, even if no
incremental funds are used to communicate their support or opposition. It is
this interpretation of the Johnson Amendment that some scholars, activists,22
and lawmakers 23 oppose. They would like to relax the Johnson Amendment
so charities could have views about the qualifications of candidates and could
communicate those views under certain limited circumstances. Almost all
critics still support the nonsubvention principle; they just want the Johnson
Amendment to permit a charity to have and communicate a view about the
qualifications of candidates for office. Some scholars have made compromise
21

See infra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
For example, Erik Stanley, the architect of the Pulpit Freedom Sunday protest movement,
proclaimed support for the FSFA. See Erik Stanley, Opinion, How to Fix the Johnson
Amendment, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2017, 7:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-fixthe-johnson-amendment-1486686394 [https://perma.cc/D22S-FZNF] (arguing that the FSFA
fixes the Johnson Amendment’s constitutional problems).
23
See H.R. 949, 116th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2019) (allowing an organization to make a statement
favoring or opposing a candidate for public office without losing its 501(c)(3) status if that
statement is “made in the ordinary course of the organization’s regular and customary activities
[and] results in the organization incurring not more than de minimis incremental expenses.”).
22
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proposals because they think that it is wrong for the IRS to prevent church
leaders from expressing views on candidates in worship services; 24 others
have proposed compromise solutions because they think that some relaxation
of the Johnson Amendment is politically likely, and they would like to
minimize the damage done.25
Compromise legislation and academic proposals attempt to permit
some communications about candidates without opening the floodgates on
all political contributions. The problem is, it is very hard to conceive of how
to permit enough speech to satisfy the critics who want more autonomy for
charities and their leaders without opening the floodgates to widespread
political influence, especially in an age in which so much partisan electoral
speech occurs on the internet and in social media, where the incremental
costs of such speech may be very low. For the Johnson Amendment’s
supporters therefore, these compromises threaten the charitable sector at its
very core. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether there could be a
compromise solution that recognizes the speech rights of charities while
simultaneously going farther than incrementalist solutions, like the FSFA, to
vindicate the nonsubvention principle.
This paper proceeds in four parts. First, it introduces the Johnson
Amendment and the current IRS guidance that pertains to organizational
leaders expressing views on the qualifications of candidates, especially
ministers expressing their views on candidates from their pulpits. Second, it
explores two types of existing proposed compromises—(i) de minimis
incremental expenditure proposals, and (ii) a variety of more speechrestrictive proposals. Third, it explores the constitutional argument against
the current Johnson Amendment, describes the minimum characteristics any
24

See, e.g., NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT:
PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 326 (2011) (advocating for an approach that
seeks to “lessen federal governmental restriction of political speech and intrusion into
religion by diminishing the IRS’s role as monitor and arbiter of the content of speech of
houses of worship . . . .”); EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH: RELIGION,
EXEMPTIONS, ENTANGLEMENT, AND THE CONSTITUTION 194 (2017) (arguing that the IRS
infringes on religious bodies’ exercise of autonomy and freedom when it monitors and
assesses internal church communications).
25
See Aprill, supra note 5, at 2 (arguing that amending the Johnson Amendment to provide
a de minimis exception for incremental expenses—a proposal that has continued support in
Congress—would eliminate the guards that prevent tax-free dollars from funding political
campaigns); cf. Samuel D. Brunson, Reigning in Charities: Using an Intermediate Penalty
to Enforce the Campaigning Prohibition, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 125, 159–68 (2011) (proposing
that Congress implement a penalty that could be imposed on tax-exempt organization as a
means of “discouraging public charities from participating in political campaigns and
improving the IRS’s ability to enforce the prohibition.”); Colinvaux, supra note 14 (positing
that enacting the proposed changes to the Johnson Amendment contained in the tax bill
would “cast[] institutions designed to promote the general good into the depraved den of
identity politics and selfish motives.”).
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proposal must have to pass constitutional muster, and evaluates the current
proposals from a constitutional lens. Fourth, it proposes a variety of types of
possible legislation that I argue would do a better job of balancing the
competing interests at play, including non-incremental expenditure taxes, and
reporting, disclosure, and governance requirements.
I. THE JOHNSON AMENDMENT’S APPLICATION TO MINISTERS’ PULPIT
SPEECH
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code describes the
qualifications that must be met for an organization to be tax-exempt under
that subsection. Section 501(c)(3) organizations are notable not only because
their income is exempt from the corporate income tax, but also donations may
be made to them on a tax-deductible basis.26 Other organizations, including
those organizations that are expressly devoted to party politics, are exempt
from income tax, but may not receive deductible contributions. The so-called
Johnson Amendment is that portion of section 501(c)(3) that requires
501(c)(3) organizations to refrain from engaging in campaign-related
activities. In its entirety, the Johnson Amendment states: “[an organization is
exempt provided it] does not participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”27
The penalty for violation of the Johnson Amendment is revocation of
tax-exempt status, because an organization that engages in political campaign
activity has not met the requirements set out in section 501(c)(3).28 However,
in addition to revocation, Congress has provided an excise tax that applies to

See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (“[T]he term ‘charitable contribution’ means a contribution or
gift to or for the use of . . . a corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation . . .
which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) . . . .”).
27
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Identical language appears in I.R.C. § 170, related to the deductibility
of charitable contributions. Id. § 170(c)(2)(D) (“[W]hich does not participate in or intervene
in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf
of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”).
28
See I.R.C. 501(c)(3) (detailing that, to qualify for exemption, an organization must not
“participate in, or intervene in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to)
any candidate for public office.”).
26
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political expenditures.29 These excise taxes can be applied to supplement
revocation, or to replace revocation in cases in which revocation is not required.30
The Treasury Regulations that pertain to the Johnson Amendment are
distressingly succinct,31 but there is official guidance from the IRS that is
very informative. In 2007, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 2007-41, which
describes in detail the IRS’s interpretation of the meaning and scope of the
Johnson Amendment.32 Because there is so much confusion about the scope
of the Johnson Amendment, it is important to emphasize some of the
things that Rev. Rul. 2007-41 makes clear that the Johnson Amendment
does not do. It does not prevent ministers (or other organizational leaders)
from speaking about politically-charged issues like abortion, sexuality,
public schooling, and religious freedom. 33 It does not prevent churches (or
other organizations) from having official views about these issues (socalled “issue advocacy”). It does not prevent organizations from inviting
candidates to speak at their meetings, including from their pulpits, as long as
the organization does not favor one candidate over others.34 It does not
prevent ministers (or other organizational leaders) from communicating their
personal views on the qualifications of candidates or even endorsing a
candidate, as long as they don’t do so in official meetings or publications of
the organization.35 And, if it is even necessary to say this, it does not impose
criminal penalties on anyone no matter what they say or do.36
So, what then does the Johnson Amendment do? At least one
important purpose of the Johnson Amendment is to prevent the use of taxSee id. § 4955(a)(1) (imposing an initial excise tax of 10% of any “political expenditure.”);
id. § 4955(a)(2) (imposing an additional tax of 2.5% of the political expenditure on each
manager who approved the expenditure); id. § 4955(b)(1) (providing that an organization
that does not correct the expenditure must pay a tax of 100% of the expenditure); id. §
4955(f)(3) (explaining that an organization that corrects the political expenditure by
“recovering part or all of the expenditure to the extent recovery is possible, [and]
establish[ing] safeguards to prevent future expenditures . . . .”).
30
See Treas. Reg. § 53.4955-1(a) (1995) (detailing that, “the excise taxes imposed by section
4955 do not affect the substantive standards for tax exception under section 501(c)(3), under
which an organization is described in section 501(c)(3) only if it does not participate or
intervene in any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.”).
31
See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3), discussed infra at note 40 (describing the factors that determine
that an organization is “not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes . . . .”); see
also id. § 53.4955-1 (discussing the excise taxes imposed on political expenditures).
32
Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421.
33
See id. (discussing permissible “issue advocacy”).
34
See id. (discussing permissible “candidate appearances”).
35
See id. (discussing permissible “individual activity by organization leaders”).
36
See Remarks by Sen. Charles Grassley, supra note 16 (“What I want to make sure is that
this minister, or any other minister, can’t be jailed just because she makes a political
statement—within—from the pulpit. That’s what I think the Johnson Amendment restricts,
and it violates freedom of speech and freedom of religion . . . .”).
29
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deductible money in political campaigns. 37 If a contribution is made on a taxdeductible basis to a 501(c)(3) organization, which is then contributed to a
campaign or spent on campaign-intervention activities, the playing field is
not level with respect to contributions or expenditures for campaign
activities. Individuals, political organizations, and business corporations get
no deduction for contributing to or spending on campaign activities, but any
contribution made to a 501(c)(3) organization that is then contributed or spent
for partisan electoral speech does effectively get a deduction. Thus, the
Johnson Amendment prevents a distortion of the campaign funding system by
preventing campaign spending by 501(c)(3) organizations, thereby requiring
all contributions and expenditures to be made on a nondeductible basis.38
The second effect of the Johnson Amendment, at least as interpreted
by the IRS, not only prevents the contribution or expenditure of funds, but
also prevents exempt organizations from using their “voice” to communicate
a preference for a candidate. The simplest version of this use of their voice
would be an official endorsement—something like a press release from the
Board of Directors of an exempt organization that the organization supports
candidate X in an upcoming political campaign. According to the IRS, this
communication would violate the Johnson Amendment. But it is not only
express endorsements that violate the Johnson Amendment, according to the
IRS. Any communication reasonably attributed to the organization that shows
a preference among candidates is forbidden. Among other things, according
to the IRS, a 501(c)(3) organization violates the Johnson Amendment when
an organizational leader—including a minister—expresses views about a
candidate during an official meeting—including a worship service—or in a
publication of the organization.39
The logic behind this prohibition is sound in two ways. First,
obviously, the statute itself does not say that an organization is prohibited
from using its money to intervene in a campaign; it says that an organization
is prohibited from intervening. The plain meaning of “intervene” plausibly
includes telling people what you think. Furthermore, the statute expressly
prohibits “the publishing or distributing of statements[.]” 40 While neither
“publishing” nor “distributing” is the same as “speaking,” it is fair to read the
statutory language as prohibiting the organization from communicating its

See Leff, supra note 2, at 676 n.4 (calling the nonsubvention principle “the only coherent
justification for the ban”).
38
See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 15, at 673 (“[A] more persuasive justification for the
prohibition is that Congress did not wish to allow tax-deductible contributions to be used for
political campaign intervention.”).
39
See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421 (explaining that a minister making an endorsement
at an official church function would violate the political campaign intervention prohibition).
40
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
37
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preferences through any means. 41 This interpretation is strengthened by
Treasury Regulations, which expand on the statutory language by defining
campaign-intervention activities as including “the publication or distribution
of written or printed statements or the making of oral statements on behalf of
or in opposition to such a candidate.”42
Second, one might argue that any time an organization communicates
its preference for a candidate, it is using its funds.43 It used its funds literally
to build (or pay for) the location at which it holds its official functions; it used
its funds to attract its members who now are present at the official function;
and it used its funds to build the credibility that gives its endorsement (or
other intervention speech) its authority. 44 It did all those things over some
period of time using funds it had collected on a tax-deductible basis. Thus, in
a very real sense the organization is spending money on the communication,
even if no incremental funds are expended in the present for the specific
speech act. There is nothing irrational or even erroneous about the IRS’s
interpretation. It is arguably the best plain-meaning interpretation of the
words and intent of the statutory language.
The most controversial kind of implied endorsement is when an
organizational leader, especially a church leader, speaks at an official
function or in an official publication. 45 Rev. Rul. 2007-41 creates a per se
rule that any such speech should be attributed to the organization rather than
to the organizational leader as an individual, and therefore this speech
violates the Johnson Amendment whenever it communicates a preference
among candidates.46 Opposition to the Johnson Amendment (except when
merely confused about its scope) has generally focused on the following
41

It arguably would also be fair to read the statutory language in a limiting way, to argue
that Congress intended only to prohibit actions that spread the organization’s opinion on
candidates to the general public, as through “publishing” or “distributing” their views. See
discussion infra Section III.A (describing Branch Ministries, which involved a 501(c)(3)
church purchasing an advertisement opposing Bill Clinton in a national publication). Under
this interpretation, an internal communication, like one from a pastor (or other organizational
leader) speaking at a church service (or other official function) would not constitute
campaign intervention.
42
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(iii) (1995) (as amended in 2017) (emphasis added).
43
I have made this argument in detail previously. See Leff, supra note 2, at 707–15
(explaining how a 501(c)(3) organization can use subsidized funds to support its campaignintervention activities without making a marginal expenditure).
44
See id. at 711–15 (arguing that, regardless of whether campaign intervention directly
utilizes subsidized funds, subsidized funds strengthen the organization and thereby enhance
the impact of the organization’s statements).
45
A variety of scholars, activists, and legislators believe that religious leaders should be
permitted to say whatever they want at worship services. See, e.g., Stanley, supra note 22
(endorsing the FSFA as a measure that will remove the Johnson Amendment’s unconstitutional
restrictions on free speech and allow charities to participate in political speech).
46
Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421–23.
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scenario: a minister (organizational leader) wishes to express their views
about the qualifications of a candidate from the pulpit (official function)
based on the values of the organization, but has been prevented from doing
so for fear that such communication would constitute an implied endorsement
and therefore a violation of the Johnson Amendment.47 Rev. Rul. 2007-41
supports the view that a communication like the one imagined would indeed
violate the Johnson Amendment and so warrant enforcement action by the
IRS.48
II. EXISTING PROPOSED COMPROMISES
As discussed above, there is general consensus among scholars that
the Johnson Amendment plays an essential role by preventing a loophole in
the tax treatment of campaign finance. 49 Because funders of political
campaigns do not generally receive a tax deduction for their campaign-related
expenditures, a complete repeal of the Johnson Amendment would permit
them to circumvent this rule by donating on a tax-deductible basis to
501(c)(3) organizations, which could then funnel their donations to a
campaign, support independent organizations that advocate for candidates, or
spend the donations to advocate for candidates themselves. There is
widespread concern that a complete repeal of the Johnson Amendment would
fundamentally transform the campaign finance system, permitting deductions
for political contributions as long as they were funneled through charities.50
However, there are numerous critics of the Johnson Amendment who argue
that the provision could be modified to permit 501(c)(3) organizations (or at
least churches) to vindicate their free speech interests (or those of their
leaders) without opening the door to a massive loophole that dramatically
drags 501(c)(3) organizations into the electoral process as conduits for
47

See discussion infra Section II.
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 1828, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS 7–9 (2009) (prohibiting 501(c)(3) organizations from political campaign
activity on behalf of candidates running for elected office); see also INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BAN ON POLITICAL CAMPAIGN
INTERVENTION BY 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS (2020), https://www.irs.gov/charities-nonprofits/charitable-organizations/frequently-asked-questions-about-the-ban-on-political-cam
paign-intervention-by-501c3-organizations-organization-position-on-issues [https://perma.cc/
GVT2-KBJD] (explaining the rule regarding 501(c)(3) organizations stating positions on
public policy issues).
49
See, e.g., Roger Colinvaux, Political Activity Limits and Tax Exemption: A Gordian’s
Knot, 34 VA. TAX REV. 1, 19–20 (2014) (defending the importance of the political activities
prohibition); Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities:
Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1339–41 (2007)
(outlining the risks of 501(c)(3) organizations intervening in political campaigns).
50
See, e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 14 (explaining the concern that repealing the Johnson
Amendment might put charitable organizations and democracy at risk).
48
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campaign finance. 51 Many of the proposals to modify the Johnson
Amendment seek to expand the scope of permissible speech to permit
discussion of candidates’ qualifications by an organizational leader, although
the focus is generally the speech of a religious leader from the pulpit or
equivalent place of authority in their house of worship.52
For many critics, the key to striking the right balance between speech
rights and disruption of the electoral process is distinguishing between what
I previously have called an “expenditure paradigm” and an “attribution
paradigm.”53 Under an expenditure paradigm, the point of regulating
electoral speech by charities is to avoid the government subsidizing such
speech through the deductibility of charitable contributions (or the exemption
of charitable earnings). 54 Under an attribution paradigm, the point of
regulating electoral speech by charities is pretty much anything else: any
argument that electoral speech by charities is dangerous whether or not it
misuses a governmental subsidy delivered through the tax code.55 The more
permissive proposals to modify the Johnson Amendment seek to permit
electoral speech that could be attributed to the charity while simultaneously
trying to eliminate or minimize abuse of the tax subsidies by widespread use
of charitable expenditures. Other proposals seek to go further.
A. De Minimis Incremental Expenditure Solutions
De minimis incremental expenditure proposals focus on the
expenditures associated with any partisan electoral speech and permit such
speech if the incremental cost of such speech is very low or nonexistent. For
example, the Commission on Accountability and Policy for Religious
Organizations (CAPRO) produced a compromise policy proposal56 that is an
example of the attempt to permit more robust electoral speech by charities
51

See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political Campaign
Activity by Charities Through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1095–1107 (2007)
(proposing a narrower set of reforms to replace the Johnson Amendment); Laura Brown
Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
308, 315 (1990) (explaining Constitutional concerns about the Johnson Amendment and
proposing reforms to address those concerns); Alan J. Samansky, Tax Consequences When
Churches Participate in Political Campaigns, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 151–52 (2007)
(advocating for treating churches differently than other kinds of charitable organizations with
regards to political activities).
52
See, e.g., ZELINSKY, supra note 24, at 201–06 (proposing a solution that only applies to
houses of worship); CRIMM & WINER, supra note 24, at 336–37 (discussing a proposed
solution in the context of houses of worship).
53
See Leff, supra note 2, at 696.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
CAPRO REPORT, supra note 18, at 28.
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(especially churches) while still preventing charities from expending funds
for electoral purposes, because permitting such expenditures “would amount
to a subsidy of such activity by the taxpayers . . . .” 57 CAPRO was created by
the Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability (“ECFA”) at the request
of Republican Senator Charles Grassley, whose staff had produced a report
that identified the Johnson Amendment as one of several federal laws that
negatively impacted religious organizations. 58 CAPRO consisted of a broad
array of “commissioners” with experience in the nonprofit (and especially
religious) community, and was advised by several advisory panels with more
specific expertise.59 Its report acknowledged that the Johnson Amendment
should not be repealed because it serves an important purpose of “prohibiting
501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations from expending funds for political
campaign-related activities.”60 It reported that “[t]here is a high level of
agreement among the Commission and Panel members that permitting the
disbursement of funds by religious and other 501(c)(3) organizations for
political campaign activities would likely have a deleterious impact on the
effectiveness and credibility of the nonprofit sector.” 61 On the other hand, the
report was also clear that “there is much accord among the members of the
Commission and its Panel . . . that a member of the clergy should be permitted
to say whatever he or she believes is appropriate in the context of a religious
worship service without fear of government reprisal, even when such
communications include content related to political candidates.” 62
In order to “strike a necessary balance” between advancing the liberty
interests of charities and preventing the expenditure of tax deductible funds
on electoral speech, CAPRO proposed that the Johnson Amendment be
interpreted to permit “a communication related to one or more political
candidates or campaigns that is made in the ordinary course of a 501(c)(3)
organization’s regular and customary religious, charitable, educational,
scientific, or other exempt-purpose activities . . . so long as the organization
does not incur more than de minimis incremental costs with respect to the
communication (that is, the organization’s costs would not have been different

57

E-mail from Mike Batts, Managing Partner, Batts Morrison Wales & Lee, to Paul
Streckfus, Editor, EO Tax Journal (Jul. 27, 2016), in Paul Streckfus, The EOTJ Mailbag, EO
TAX J. 2016-144 (“Some argue that since contributions to (c)(3)s are tax deductible, allowing
(c)(3)s to engage in political activity would amount to a subsidy of such activity by the
taxpayers . . . and as a matter of tax policy, that is a no-go.”); he also described the
compromise as “The Commission addressed this issue specifically by offering an elegant, if
not perfect, solution of permitting ‘no cost political communications.’”).
58
CAPRO REPORT, supra note 18, at 4.
59
See id. at 61–88 (listing short biographies of commissioners and advisory panel members).
60
Id. at 27.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 4, 28.
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by any significant amount had the communication not occurred).”63 The report
calls this type of communication a “no-cost political communication.”64
For many years, congressional Republicans have proposed legislation
to eliminate or curtail the Johnson Amendment. The current proposed
legislation with the most support among congressional Republicans is the
Free Speech Fairness Act of 2019 (FSFA),65 which is explicitly modeled on
the CAPRO proposal. That bill expressly amends section 501 of the Internal
Revenue Code to make clear that:
[A]n organization . . . shall [not] be deemed to have
participated in, or intervened in any political campaign on
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office,
solely because of the content of any statement which—
“(A) is made in the ordinary course of the
organization’s regular and customary activities in
carrying out its exempt purpose, and
“(B) results in the organization incurring not more
than de minimis incremental expenses.”66
The FSFA therefore expressly adopts a de minimis incremental
expenditure approach to modifying the Johnson Amendment, which permits
all “no-cost political communications” while still prohibiting the expenditure
of greater sums by a 501(c)(3) organization to engage in partisan political
speech. It is an attempt to more fully recognize the speech (or free exercise)
interests of charities while at least attempting to prevent a complete
transformation of the campaign finance system.
Even Erik Stanley, the architect of Pulpit Freedom Sunday, who
vigorously argues that the Johnson Amendment is unconstitutional root and
branch,67 supports the compromise approach of the FSFA, arguing that “[t]he
Free Speech Fairness Act . . . fixes the law’s constitutional problems . . . . [It]
would get the IRS out of the speech-police business while prohibiting
political expenditures or contributions by tax-exempt organizations.”68

63

Id. at 28.
Id.
65
H.R. 949, 116th Cong. (2019).
66
Id. § 2(a). The Bill applies this definition to sections 501(c)(3), 170 (deduction for
charitable contributions), 2055 (exemption from estate tax), 2106 (exemption from estate
tax), 2522 (exemption from gift tax), and 4955 (excise taxes on political expenditures by
501(c)(3) organizations), and so there would be no excise taxes or other impediment to an
organization acting in the ways sanctioned by the Bill.
67
See Erik W. Stanley, LBJ, the IRS, and Churches: The Unconstitutionality of the Johnson
Amendment in Light of Recent Supreme Court Precedent, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 237, 240
(2012) (arguing that the Johnson Amendment violates the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment).
68
Stanley, supra note 22.
64
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Thus, the leading compromise proposal coming from conservatives
adopts an approach in which “no-cost political communication” is permitted
for 501(c)(3) organizations, but any use of “subsidized” funds is prohibited.
Indeed, this bifurcation of speech into “no-cost” and “subsidized” speech is
the most obvious solution to the constitutional problem posed by the Johnson
Amendment and the Supreme Court jurisprudence on tax provisions that limit
speech. Under this analysis, the government is free to provide “subsidies”
(including beneficial tax provisions like the charitable exemption and
deductibility of charitable contributions) for activities that do not include
engaging in political speech. This is the so-called “nonsubvention” principle:
that the government’s choice not to subsidize political speech is not a
“burden” on a person’s (or organization’s) speech rights, and so the
government does not have to justify that choice under any kind of heightened
constitutional scrutiny.69 Under this analysis, there is no burden on speech if
the government permits charitable tax status under the condition that the
financial benefits of such status are not used for political speech. But scholars
and courts have generally understood that the government is not permitted to
provide tax subsidies on the condition that the recipient forego their right to
engage in such speech using their own funds.70 The Supreme Court has held
that in order to avoid burdening the speech of the recipient of a government
benefit, the government must permit some “alternate means” that the
recipient may use to engage in political speech. 71 In the leading case on tax
subsidies for 501(c)(3) organizations (which held that the limits on lobbying
by 501(c)(3) organizations were constitutional) that alternate means was
understood to be the use of an affiliated 501(c)(4) organization, which is
permitted to engage in unlimited lobbying. 72 Therefore, the constitutional
jurisprudence encourages a focus on expenditures in drawing the line
See Regan v. Tax’n With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (“We have
held in several contexts that a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a
fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.”).
70
For a discussion of the so-called “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine’s application to
speech-related conditions on government-provided benefits to nonprofit organizations, see,
e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofits, Speech, and Unconstitutional Conditions, 46 CONN.
L. REV. 1045, 1048 (2014) (articulating the article’s “goal of bringing clarity to . . . speechrelated conditions on government-provided benefits to nonprofit organizations.”). The
doctrine was reaffirmed in a recent Supreme Court opinion (albeit in dissent). See Agency
for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. 140 S. Ct. 2082, 2092 (2020) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“Congress may not, however, ‘leverage funding to regulate speech outside the
contours’ of the program it has chosen to subsidize.”) (quoting Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All.
for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 214–15 (2013)).
71
See Regan, 461 U.S. at 544 (“It also appears that TWR can obtain tax deductible
contributions for its nonlobbying activity by returning to the dual structure it used in the past,
with a § 501(c)(3) organization for nonlobbying activities and a § 501(c)(4) organization for
lobbying.”).
72
Id.
69
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between nonsubvention (which is constitutionally unproblematic) and
requiring the recipient to forego or limit political speech (which would
presumably be a burden that would need to be justified by heightened or even
strict scrutiny). It is not surprising, then, that a compromise proposal
regarding the Johnson Amendment would attempt to permit “no-cost political
communication,” since the absence of any cost negates the government’s
purpose in restricting political speech by tax subsidy recipients. In effect,
engaging in “no-cost political communication” should function as well as any
other alternate means of communicating the recipient’s own political views.
Several years ago, I made my first attempt to propose a
constitutionally appropriate application of the Johnson Amendment that
balanced speech rights against the nonsubvention principle. 73 I argued that
the IRS’s interpretation of the provision (as described in Revenue Ruling
2007-41) was too restrictive of the speech of 501(c)(3) organizations because
it did not permit any alternate means for communicating the organization’s
own views on candidates. 74 At the same time, I pointed out that
nonsubvention is more complicated than it might at first seem. I argued that
two types of then-current proposals, de minimis proposals and “marginal
cost” proposals, insufficiently take into account the expenditure of subsidized
funds that bolster or benefit an organization’s political speech. Firstly, that is
because organizations can engage in speech that mixes its ordinary charitable
speech with electoral speech without making any (or very, very little)
incremental or marginal expenditure for the electoral speech. For example,
an organization that sends a monthly two-page newsletter educating its
members about environmental issues expends no incremental funds when it
includes in the newsletter an endorsement of a candidate. But the fact that it
spends no additional funds to communicate its views does not mean that it
has not used the government benefit to do so. The existence of its charitable
newsletter enables the organization to reach so many people with its message,
and therefore the government has not avoided subsidizing the organization’s
electoral speech since it subsidized the creation and development of the
newsletter and its readership. The newsletter represents not just the cost of ink
and paper and postage (I know, I know; no one sends newsletters anymore), but
also the mailing list of recipients. For some organizations, the mailing list is their
most valuable asset, and if it is shared between charitable uses and electoral, the

See Leff, supra note 2, at 679–80 (proposing an “expenditure paradigm” narrowly tailored
to the government’s interest in regulating expenditures).
74
See Leff, supra note 2, at 677 (“This article argues . . . that the Service’s current
interpretation of the Ban likely exceeds permissible constitutional bounds.”).
73
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electoral uses are subsidized by the charitable ones if a de minimis or marginal
cost theory is used.75
Even more importantly, though, is the fact that when an organization
communicates its support for a candidate, it leverages the value of its
“credibility.” As I argued previously,
Indeed, the very concept of an ‘endorsement’ presupposes that
the listener cares more about the credibility of the speaker than
the content of the argument such speaker makes on behalf of
the candidate . . . . An argument could be made that subsidized
expenditures made by an organization over its entire history
have served on some basis to enhance its credibility. Whatever
it has spent its money on, that money has served to enhance
the perceived legitimacy of the organization among its
constituency. When it makes an endorsement, the
organization draws upon this history of legitimacy.76
Again, if the organization’s electoral use (which the government
intends to avoid subsidizing) leverages the value created by the
organization’s charitable use, which has been subsidized, then the
government has not avoided subvention.
In other words, CAPRO’s “no-cost political speech” is not “no-cost”
at all. Thus, the FSFA—because it takes a “de minimis incremental expense”
approach to measuring the cost of electoral speech—errs on the side of
permitting too much electoral speech by nonprofits in its attempt to strike a
balance between the goals of permitting speech and nonsubvention. Of
course, given the difficulty of a true measurement of the “cost” of certain
types of political speech, Congress can strike the balance in this way if it
chooses, but there are critics of the FSFA who believe that such an approach
would open a gigantic loophole in the campaign finance system, and they are
seeking ways to limit the impact of that proposed loophole to strike a better
balance between competing goals.
B. Proposed More Restrictive Solutions
Professor Ellen Aprill has recently published an especially incisive
critique of de minimis incremental expense approaches to the Johnson
In the political context, the value of a “mailing list” (or membership) is even more obvious.
For example, Professor Brian Galle points out, “political theorists believe that a key source
of lobbyist influence is the threat, often implicit, that the lobbyist can mobilize her
constituency to vote against the official she is lobbying . . . . A charity offers the lobbyist a
built-in grassroots constituency she can use in this way, saving her . . . the costs of building
a separate organization.” Brian Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1561, 1608 (2013).
76
Leff, supra note 2, at 713.
75

Vol. 6:1]

Fixing the Johnson Amendment

135

Amendment, like those advanced by CAPRO and Representative Scalise. In
Amending the Johnson Amendment in the Age of Cheap Speech,77 Aprill
argues that “[t]he [FSFA] would have opened the floodgates to campaign
intervention by charities and encourages the establishment of faux
charities.”78 Because the Bill permits organizations to engage in partisan
electoral speech as long as such speech is “in the ordinary course of the
organization’s regular and customary activities,” 79 Professor Aprill warns
that new organizations could be created that communicate broadly with a
wide constituency as part of their regular and customary activities in carrying
out their exempt purpose, and the Bill would permit them to include partisan
electoral speech (even official endorsements) in all those communications—
newsletters, email blasts, websites, social media accounts, television
advertisements, paid Facebook or Google advertisements, door-to-door
advocacy, etc.80 As long as these means of communication are established as
a customary practice of the organization in communicating its tax-exempt
purpose, then the inclusion of partisan electoral speech in the communications
would presumably not add more than a de minimis incremental expense. More
importantly, even for established charities, the Internet has provided an
unprecedented audience at minimal incremental cost. Aprill worries that the
availability of “cheap speech” through the internet or social media undermines
any incremental-expense approach to limiting the partisan electoral speech of
charities.81 Because “[c]harities can have enormous influence on political
campaigns with little expense in today’s digital world”82 she cautions that “[a]s
a practical matter, [an incremental-cost approach] will come close to simply
eliminating the campaign intervention prohibition.”83
Nonetheless, Aprill acknowledges that we might be moving towards
the adoption of some de minimis or incremental-cost solution like the FSFA.
She argues that “[i]f we care about the influence of campaign speech by
section 501(c)(3) organizations, regardless of the cost, we may . . . need to . . .
take a different regulatory approach to the issue.”84 Aprill’s regulatory proposal
is “a radical approach—disclosure of donors, whether or not they itemize, to
section 501(c)(3) organizations unless they specify that their donations will not
77

Aprill, supra note 5.
Id. at 7. This refers not to FSFA but to provisions in the House version of the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 5201 (2017), discussed in Aprill, supra note 5, at 1, that
“mirrored” the FSFA and the CAPRO recommendations. See Aprill supra note 5, at 5 (“Their
proposed legislation resembled the recommendation made in 2013 by the Commission on
Accountability and Policy for Religious Organizations.”).
79
H.R. 949, 116th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2019).
80
Aprill, supra note 5, at 8.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 9.
83
Id. at 8.
84
Id. at 12.
78
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be used for campaign intervention or for lobbying.”85 If donors don’t explicitly
limit the permissible use of their contributions, then the organization could file
a statement that it will not engage in any campaign intervention, which would
keep its donors identities private.86 But if the organization did not expressly
abstain from campaign-related speech, any donors who did not expressly
limit the use of their donations would have their names publicly disclosed, so
at least “voters understand who is funding the campaign intervention to make
the informed decision that the Supreme Court prizes.”87
Aprill is not alone in recognizing the problem with “cheap speech”
and hoping for, or proposing, solutions that would do as good a job as
possible to balance the recognized need for at least some opportunity for
electoral speech by charities while simultaneously limiting the harm done to
the “basic principle” that “only dollars that have been taxed can be used for
political intervention.”88 Professor Roger Colinvaux believes that the current
absolute prohibition on electoral speech by charities is constitutionally
permissible and should stand. 89 But he, like Aprill, recognizes that the current
absolute prohibition may not survive much longer. In a wide-ranging article
exploring a host of difficulties that would be created if the status quo
interpretation of the prohibition ceased being tenable, Colinvaux argues that
a “taxing speech” approach might be necessary to prevent government
subvention,90 but that “the political activities of charities that did not have
expenditures directly associated with the activity (such as endorsements,
which may require little-to-no direct expenditure) generally would not be
captured [by any attempt to measure the cost of political speech].” 91
Colinvaux argues that the “no-cost” political activity that was permitted
under this approach, and for which deductible charitable contributions could
still be made, “likely would be an enormous loophole. Thus, a serious risk of
charity capture, and substantial revenue loss, would remain.” 92 But Colinvaux
85

Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Colinvaux, supra note 15, at 709. He also argues that if it was found to be constitutionally
problematic, the prohibition could be shifted from section 501 to section 170, and taxpayers
could be denied deductible charitable contributions if the organization they contribute to
engages in any partisan electoral speech. Id. at 744 (“The disallowance of the charitable
deduction for contributions to organizations that engage in political activity requires a
distinct constitutional challenge, which it should easily survive.”).
90
Id. at 753 (“Notwithstanding these objections, of the alternatives to the Political Activities
Prohibition, a taxing speech approach probably is the best.”).
91
Id. at 751.
92
Id. at 755. See also Colinvaux, supra note 14 (warning of “devastating results” that will
accrue to the charitable sector if the absolute prohibition is replaced with an incremental
expense approach).
86
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laments weaknesses in any other approach that attempts to limit the potential
damage that will be done if the status quo interpretation of the Johnson
Amendment is changed to permit partisan electoral speech by charities. 93
Professor Edward Zelinsky also recently acknowledged the problems
with cheap speech in the internet age, but he has taken a different approach
in his proposal to limit the impact of loosening the prohibition. He argues that
the Johnson Amendment needs to be fixed to better balance the constitutional
necessity of permitting ministers to speak freely from the pulpit with the
legitimate government interest in “preventing the tax-exempt sector from
becoming a conduit for tax-deductible campaign contributions.” 94 Zelinsky
recognizes that “[i]n today’s world of the Internet and electronic media”
internal communications by church leaders can have extremely broad reach
without any substantial incremental expenditure. 95 “Through social media
and television, a celebrity preacher like Rev. Joel Osteen is regularly heard
and read by millions each week.”96
Zelinsky proposes a solution that he argues is more restrictive and
therefore protects the integrity of the electoral system at least slightly more
than the FSFA. First he argues that the Johnson Amendment should be
enforced as currently interpreted against all 501(c)(3) organizations that are
not houses of worship.97 Second, he argues that houses of worship should be
permitted to engage in partisan electoral speech but only in “internal”
communications.98 While acknowledging that the definition of “internal” will
93

Colinvaux, supra note 14.
Edward A. Zelinsky, Churches’ Lobbying and Campaigning: A Proposed Statutory Safe
Harbor for Internal Church Communications, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1527, 1528 (2017).
Zelinsky proceeds to comment that “[t]he revised statute should discourage the diversion of taxexempt resources into campaigning and lobbying, while safeguarding internal church discussions
from church-state entanglement.” Id. at 1547. See also ZELINSKY, supra note 24, at 204
(proposing a “safe harbor” to protect in-house church communications “from both the Section
501(c)(3) prohibition on campaigning and that section’s prohibition of substantial lobbying.”).
95
Zelinsky, supra note 94, at 1548.
96
Id. at 1549.
97
Id. at 1547. Because Zelinsky’s major complaint is with church-state entanglement, not
with general free speech concerns, this limitation to houses of worship seems to him to be
appropriately narrowly tailored. Since I believe that the primary imperfections in the current
interpretation of the Johnson Amendment are due to overly restricting speech rights, applying a
solution only to houses of worship does not solve the problem (and potentially raises new
constitutional concerns under the Establishment Clause by favoring religious organizations).
Evaluating the respective positions in this discussion is well beyond the scope of the present Article.
98
Id. at 1545–51. Creating an exception for “internal communications” only in the context
of houses of worship has long been a favorite solution for those commentators who argue
that religious organizations have a special role to play in electoral politics. See, e.g.,
Samansky, supra note 51, at 165 (arguing that, as long as they do not include official
endorsements, “churches and religious leaders should have virtually complete freedom to
communicate with their congregations” in sermons and other routine communications); see
94
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be strained by the ways that churches regularly project their church services
to the masses, he argues that his limitation to internal communications would
be “a stronger barrier against the potential use of tax-deductible donations for
political campaigning”99 because “[u]nder the [Senate’s version of the FSFA],
a non-church religious organization could construe its [tax-]exempt purpose as
including communication aimed at the general public . . . . [which] could permit
the diversion of tax-deductible contributions to political campaigning.”100
Zelinsky thus presents his solution as less destructive to the campaign finance
system than the FSFA, which would create a broader loophole.
Professor Nina Crimm and her co-author Laurence Winer propose an
even more restrictive “internal speech” solution to the problem of “cheap
speech,” attempting to better balance First Amendment interests of
organizations with the nonsubvention principle. 101 They propose a minor
change to the Johnson Amendment to apply to all 501(c)(3) organizations,
and a more substantial opportunity for electoral speech that would only apply
to houses of worship.102 For all 501(c)(3) organizations, the prohibition on
electoral speech would be removed from section 501(c)(3), so no
organization would risk losing its tax-exempt status because of such
speech.103 But the restriction would be added to section 170, meaning that
any contribution to a section 501(c)(3) organization that did engage in any
amount of electoral speech would not be deductible for the donor.104 Professor
Colinvaux also argues for a shift of the location of the prohibition from section
501(c)(3) to section 170,105 and both Colinvaux and Crimm & Winer argue that
a restriction in section 170 would be less constitutionally problematic than the
current one that resides in section 501(c)(3), even though it would prevent any
also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, When Soft Law Meets Hard Politics: Taming the Wild West of
Nonprofit Political Involvement, 45 J. LEGIS. 194, 228 (2018) (“Churches should therefore
be allowed to include political messages in their in-person, internal communications with
their members during worship services.”).
99
Zelinksy, supra note 94, at 1550.
100
Id.
101
See CRIMM & WINER, supra note 24, at 321–52 (discussing the “thorny constitutional
issues” raised by the 501(c)(3) tax exemption and proposing solutions).
102
Id. at 322–23. As discussed, supra note 97, I personally believe that creating a more
permissive regime for electoral speech by houses of worship than any other kind of 501(c)(3)
organization creates more problems than it solves. But Crimm & Winer make a strong argument
that houses of worship are unique in material respects that make their case for an opportunity to
communicate electoral speech to their members stronger. Id. at 325. Treatment of this issue is
well beyond the scope of this article, but it is sufficient here to point out that (1) a properly crafted
solution that created an opportunity for all 501(c)(3) organizations to engage in limited electoral
speech would also solve the problem for houses of worship, and (2) a solution that was only
available to houses of worship would be controversial.
103
Id. at 326–27.
104
Id.
105
Colinvaux, supra note 15, at 743–44.
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organization that engages in campaign-intervention speech from receiving taxdeductible contributions for any of its activities.106 This solution, in effect,
turns 501(c)(3) organizations that engage in any electoral speech into section
501(c)(4) organizations, because they are free to engage in electoral speech,
their income is exempt from the corporate income tax, and contributions to
them are not deductible to the donor (all characteristics of 501(c)(4)
organizations). But they would not be identical to section 501(c)(4)
organizations, most notably because they could retain the 501(c)(3) label, and
would not need to reorganize or re-apply for recognition of exemption.
Crimm & Winer then propose a new category of section 501(c) that
would be available only to houses of worship that choose to opt into it (and
out of 501(c)(3)). This new category would permit houses of worship to
engage in electoral speech and still receive tax-deductible contributions, but
only if the speech occurred “exclusively within the confines of a private
setting” and “for which existing congregants are the intended audience.” 107
This proposal is a version of Zelinsky’s proposal to permit only “internal”
church communications, but it is significantly more restrictive than
Zelinsky’s proposal. Crimm & Winer argue that, under their proposal,
“[i]ntending to engage, or actually engaging, in external political campaign
speech would automatically disqualify a house of worship from the new . . .
(proposed) tax classification.”108 They clarify that a communication would
be “internal” even if it was made electronically to a wide audience who was
not present in person, but only if “through means that are not accessible to
the general public, such as closed-circuit television or a Web site that locks
out nonmembers.”109 Similarly, a “hard-copy pastoral letter or newsletter”
could contain electoral speech, but only “if confined solely to existing
congregants or parishioners in a diocese.”110
Crimm & Winer recognize that in the age of cheap speech, purely
internal communications can become external communications easily by
being spread through social media or otherwise shared. But their proposal
includes a requirement that “houses of worship must take all reasonable
measures to urge their congregations to refrain from disseminating the
private, internal partisan communications.” 111 The houses of worship even
have an affirmative duty under the proposal to “make such dissemination[s]
. . . difficult in order to alleviate concerns of complicity or even conspiratorial
behavior.”112 Crimm & Winer suggest that houses of worship include a
106

Colinvaux, supra note 15, at 744; CRIMM & WINER, supra note 24, at 328, 332.
CRIMM & WINER, supra note 24, at 338.
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legend on all such written communications that they are not to be shared;
presumably, however, they would also be required to use available
technology to make any videos that include partisan communications difficult
or impossible to copy or share. 113 While they do not discuss it directly, this
limitation would presumably apply to efforts by any affiliated organization
to share or spread the message of the church’s endorsement or other partisan
electoral speech. Thus, a house of worship would not be permitted to create
(or cooperate in the creation of) a 501(c)(4) or 527 organization that would
use its own funds to publicize the church’s partisan electoral teaching to a
public audience. Similarly, if a candidate asked if they could share
information about the church’s support on their own website or in their
campaign materials or even in public speeches, the house of worship would
have to decline. Obviously, a difficult question would arise if members of
the press asked a representative of a house of worship if it (or its pastoral
leadership) had a view about the candidates that had been expressed to
members. Again, presumably the church would have to decline to confirm
or deny such reports. Because this new opportunity to engage in partisan
speech is housed in a new provision of section 501(c), the penalty for a
house of worship that participated in the spread of its internal partisan
electoral message would presumably be loss of tax-exempt status.
Professor Samuel Brunson has acknowledged the problem with cheap
speech and proposed a sort of hybrid approach, supplementing the current
501(c)(3) ban with a penalty regime that would apply to the deductibility of
donations to charities that engage in partisan electoral speech. 114 He proposes
that a tax be imposed that takes back the benefit of deductible contributions
applied directly to those contributors who received the benefit. 115 The penalty
would be a percentage of the deduction that was equal to the percentage of
the charity’s expenditures that went toward campaigning, if that amount was
high.116 But, acknowledging that “[e]mail, for example, is virtually costless .
. .” he proposes that donors to charities that spent little on their partisan political
speech would pay a penalty based on “a percentage calculated by the size of the
audience toward which the political speech was directed.”117 The denominator
or the fraction would be the total number of donors to the charity that year, and
113

Id.
See Samuel D. Brunson, Reigning in Charities: Using an Intermediate Penalty to Enforce
the Campaigning Prohibition, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 125, 159–68 (2011) (arguing for a tax law
that disallows a portion of donors’ deduction to the public charity).
115
See id. at 159 (“Instead of penalizing the public charity, the tax law should disallow a
portion of the deduction taken by donors to the public charity that campaigned on behalf of
or against any individual.”).
116
See id. at 160 (“Rather than penalizing the public charity as a proportion of its expenditures,
the intermediate penalty would disallow a percentage of donors’ charitable deductions.”).
117
Id.
114
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the numerator would be the intended audience. For example, “[i]f a pastor
endorsed a candidate during a sermon, the people to whom the endorsement was
directed would be those in the congregation. If a university bought an ad in the
New York Times, the number of people to whom it was directed would be the
circulation of the New York Times.”118 If the number of people to whom the
communication is directed is greater than the total number of donors for the
year, then the penalty would be 100% of the value of the deduction (in effect
disallowing the deduction of the contribution to that charity for the year),119
and the charity would be required to notify donors of what portion of their
donation is deductible based on their calculation of the penalty. 120
Brunson argues that it is only fair to base the penalty on the acts of
the charity itself, not of any other entity or person who subsequently spread
the charity’s message. So, he acknowledges that “[t]hese tests can be gamed,
of course. A public charity could, for example, send out an email endorsing
a candidate to a single person, knowing that the recipient would forward the
email to a much larger group.”121 But he claims that if there was evidence
that a charity showed deliberate intent to avoid or minimize the penalty,
presumably for example by using a controlled affiliate entity, then the IRS
could still revoke its tax-exempt status, since Brunson is not arguing that the
Johnson Amendment be removed from section 501(c)(3).122 Brunson argues that
this proposed penalty regime is superior to a regime that applies penalties to
charities themselves both because it mitigates the problem of “cost free political
speech” and because it forces the charities to communicate with their donors in
a way that might incentivize donors to exert control to limit the charity’s partisan
political speech.123
C. Permissive Expenditure Solutions versus More Restrictive Solutions
The proposed revisions of the Johnson Amendment fall into two
camps. First, some critics argue that the Johnson Amendment is too
restrictive of speech, especially the speech of spiritual leaders of houses of
118

Id. at 161.
See id. at 162 (“[T]he intermediate penalty would cap the disallowance at 100%.”).
120
See id. at 163 (“[I]t would require the public charity to send a notice to its donors
from the year of the violation, informing them of the percentage of their donation that
would not be deductible.”).
121
Id. at 162.
122
See id. (“But the intermediate penalty is not the only penalty in the IRS’s quiver: it would
still be able to revoke the public charity’s tax exemption. Structuring an endorsement in a
manner intended to avoid the penalty demonstrates awareness of the rule and a deliberate
intent to avoid the rule.”).
123
See id. at 159 (“[D]onors to the public charity have the incentive to make sure that the
public charity does not violate the campaigning prohibition.”); id. at 164 (“[I]f its actions may
increase its donors’ tax bills, violating the campaigning prohibition risks alienating its donors.”).
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worship. They argue that the Johnson Amendment should be revised to
permit speech by houses of worship or their leaders, so long as such speech
does not involve more than a de minimis incremental expense in its
promulgation.124 This would permit partisan political commentary from the
pulpit of churches. Second, other critics argue that an incremental expense
solution, like the one proposed in the FSFA, would open up a massive loophole
in the campaign finance system, encouraging far too much partisan political
speech to be funneled through 501(c)(3) organizations, and therefore
insufficiently valuing the integrity of the campaign finance system. They
therefore propose solutions that would be less restrictive than the current status
quo interpretation of the Johnson Amendment, but more restrictive than the
proposed incremental expenditure solutions like the FSFA.125
The problem is that the more restrictive solutions do not solve the
constitutional infirmities of the current interpretation of the Johnson
Amendment. That does not mean that there is no way to open up the Johnson
Amendment to more speech, including pulpit speech of ministers, to avoid
Constitutional issues. It just means that other mechanisms must be used to
narrow the speech permitted beyond a simple incremental expenditure analysis.
III. BETTER BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS (ORGANIZATIONAL
SPEECH RIGHTS VERSUS NONSUBVENTION)
In the previous Section, I presented proposals by some Johnson
Amendment critics to either change or interpret the Johnson Amendment to
permit more partisan electoral speech than is currently permitted (at least
theoretically) by the IRS. Other commentators fear that these de minimis
incremental speech proposals will open to the door to too much partisan
electoral speech and activity by charities and will therefore underserve the
nonsubvention principle and undermine the integrity of the campaign finance
system. In order to critically evaluate their proposals, however, it is necessary
to draw out the implications of Constitutional arguments that underlie the
critique of the current interpretation of the Johnson Amendment. In this
Section, I describe the Free Speech jurisprudence that applies to all charities,
and the minimal characteristics of a modification of the Johnson Amendment
that would validate free speech interests and pass constitutional muster.
A. Expanded Constitutional Analysis
It makes good sense that proposed modifications of the Johnson
Amendment, like the FSFA, focus on expenditures in their relaxing of
124
125

See discussion supra Section II.A.
See discussion supra Section II.B.
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restrictions on partisan electoral speech. The leading doctrinal argument for
the constitutionality of the Johnson Amendment relies on a DC Circuit Court
case that held that the Johnson Amendment (as applied by the IRS) did not
violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or RFRA. The
case is Branch Ministries v. Rossotti.126 In that case, Branch Ministries, a
501(c)(3) church, took out a full-page advertisement in a national publication
warning Christians that then-presidential-candidate Bill Clinton supported
policies that were anathema to the values of the church.127 The advertisement
included an express plea for “tax-deductible donations” to the church to
support its campaign-related activities, which resulted in “hundreds of
contributions to the Church from across the country . . . .” 128 In its defense,
the church argued (among other things) that the removal of its tax-exempt
status on account of the advertisement represented a substantial burden on its
free expression of religion in violation of the First Amendment. 129
The court rejected Branch Ministries’ argument, stating that the
church’s free exercise is not burdened because it has an “alternate means” for
expressing its view on Bill Clinton’s worthiness for office. 130 It cited the
Supreme Court’s holding in Regan v. Taxation With Representation that “the
availability of such an alternate means of communication is essential to the
constitutionality of section 501(c)(3)’s restrictions on lobbying.” 131 It then
stated that “the Church can initiate a series of steps that will provide an
alternate means of political communication that will satisfy the standards set
by the concurring Justices in Regan.”132 That series of steps, presumably,
would be for the church to create some alternative organization that is not
tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3), and that organization would have paid
for the advertisement. The court then emphasized what was at stake in the
case by stating, “[t]hat the Church cannot use its tax-free dollars to fund such
[an alternate organization] unquestionably passes constitutional muster. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that . . . ‘Congress has not violated [an
organization’s] First Amendment rights by declining to subsidize its First
Amendment activities.’”133 Supporters of the IRS’s interpretation of the
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211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
See id. at 140 (The advertisement “bore the headline ‘Christians Beware’ and asserted
that then-Governor Clinton’s positions concerning abortion, homosexuality, and the
distribution of condoms to teenagers in schools violated Biblical precepts.”).
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Id.
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Id. at 142.
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See id. at 143 (“We also reject the Church’s argument that it is substantially burdened
because it has no alternate means by which to communicate its sentiments about candidates
for public office . . . . The Church has such an avenue available to it.”).
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Johnson Amendment present this holding as validation of the
constitutionality of the law.
But the actual operation of the “alternate means” of communicating
the church’s views was purely speculative in the Branch Ministries case. The
church had not attempted to use any alternative means, and so the impact on
the IRS’s enforcement against an organization attempting to use such means
was not tested in that case. Remember, the point of the alternate means is for
an organization to communicate its views on candidates without using taxdeductible contributions to do so. Its views are protected speech, but
communicating such views is not substantially burdened so long as it has
some alternate means of communicating those views without “subsidized”
dollars. This point is made particularly clear in Justice Blackmun’s
concurrence in Regan, in which he stated:
It must be remembered that § 501(c)(3) organizations retain
their constitutional right to speak and to petition the
Government. Should the IRS attempt to limit the control these
organizations have over [their alternate means], the First
Amendment problems would be insurmountable. It hardly
answers one person’s objection to a restriction on his speech
that another person, outside his control, may speak for him.
Similarly, an attempt to prevent § 501(c)(4) organizations
from lobbying explicitly on behalf of their § 501(c)(3)
affiliates would perpetuate § 501(c)(3) organizations’
inability to make known their views on legislation without
incurring the unconstitutional penalty. Such restrictions would
extend far beyond Congress’ mere refusal to subsidize
lobbying. In my view, any such restriction would render the
statutory scheme unconstitutional. 134
While the Court in Regan was discussing the restrictions on lobbying,
the logic applies equally to campaign-related speech, as was made clear in
Branch Ministries.135 A 501(c)(3) organization has a constitutionally
protected right to communicate its views on candidates without the
government imposing a substantial burden on it. On the other hand, the
government is permitted to impose restrictions on how a 501(c)(3) organization
uses the dollars it collects on a tax-deductible basis, as it has done in the
Johnson Amendment. It just must be sure that the law permits some alternate
means for the organization to communicate its views on candidates.
134

Regan, 461 U.S. at 553–54 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
In Branch Ministries, the D.C. Circuit stated that “[t]he Court subsequently confirmed [in
FCC v. League of Women’s Voters, 486 U.S. 364, 400 (1984)] that [the description of the
necessity of an alternate means found in the concurrence in Regan] was an accurate
description of its holding.” 211 F.3d at 143. In other words, the Supreme Court subsequently
adopted Justice Blackmun’s concurrence’s view of the law as its own.
135
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Current IRS guidance arguably forecloses the use of such alternate
means, creating a restriction that (in the words of Justice Blackmun)
“render[s] the statutory scheme unconstitutional.” 136 That is because Rev.
Rul. 2007-41 adopts what I have previously called an “attribution
paradigm.”137 This attribution paradigm can be illustrated by imagining that
Branch Ministries had attempted to employ an alternate means of
communicating its views on Bill Clinton rather than taking out the
advertisement using tax-deductible contributions. This advertisement would
have been paid for by an affiliated 501(c)(4) organization, for example the
Branch Ministries Social Action Fund. 138 There is no dispute that such a
Social Action Fund could take out an advertisement that warned Christians
of candidate Bill Clinton’s views on matters important to the church, and it
could even expressly urge readers to vote against Clinton. There are two key
questions raised by Rev. Rul. 2007-41: (1) could the church directly control
the Social Action Fund? and (2) could the advertisement explicitly identify
the church as the source of the communication? For example, could the
church at a meeting of its board of directors adopt a resolution stating that it
is the view of the church that Christians should vote against Bill Clinton
because of his positions on issues important to the church, and then direct the
Social Action Fund to pay all the costs of publishing the text of this resolution
in national newspapers? In short, could the church use some alternate means
to communicate its view on candidates?
As for the first question—whether a church can control a social action
fund being used as the church’s “alternate means”—Rev. Rul. 2007-41 is
arguably silent. The Revenue Ruling does not directly address what the
directors of a 501(c)(3) may do in their meetings. But prior IRS guidance
suggests that it is the view of the IRS that such an action would constitute an
impermissible act of campaign intervention. For example, a 1999 IRS
educational publication states that the actions of an affiliated 501(c)(4)
organization will not constitute a violation of the prohibition as long as the
501(c)(4) does not use the “resources or assets” of the 501(c)(3) affiliate. 139
But it then goes on to state, “[a]n important asset of an IRC 501(c)(3)
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Regan, 461 U.S. at 554 (Blackman, J., concurring).
See Leff, supra note 2, at 698–702 (arguing that under the IRS’s attribution paradigm,
“the affiliate-organizations solution . . . is arguably incapable of providing 501(c)(3)
organizations with a mechanism to engage in protected speech.”).
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This fund would have to be separately incorporated and raise all its funds on a non-taxdeductible basis. It would also have to have some purpose other than campaign intervention
as its primary purpose, but could engage in campaign intervention activities, so long as such
activities were small in amount.
139
Ward L. Thomas & Judith E. Kindell, Affiliations Among Political, Lobbying and
Educational Organizations, in IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL
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organization is the time of its officers and directors.” 140 It concludes that the
direction of a (c)(4) by a (c)(3) would constitute impermissible campaign
intervention by the (c)(3).141 An inevitable consequence of this reasoning is
that discussion or the adoption of an express endorsement resolution within
a board meeting would also constitute a violation of the prohibition. 142
Furthermore, a prohibition on campaign-intervention speech within a board
meeting could be inferred from Revenue Ruling 2007-41. Because the
Revenue Ruling prohibits campaign-related speech by organizational leaders
at official functions of the organization, such speech may be prohibited even
at board meetings. Board members are unquestionably “organizational
leaders” and a board meeting is presumably an “official function” of the
organization. The Revenue Ruling provides exemplary situations, and in
Situation 6, it describes the chairman of the board of directors of a 501(c)(3)
organization speaking at “a regular meeting” of the organization. It does not
explicitly say that this “regular meeting” is a meeting of the board of directors,
but such an inference is a fair reading of the text. The Revenue Ruling then
concludes that such speech violates the prohibition “[b]ecause Chairman D’s
remarks . . . were made during an official organizational meeting.”143
With regards to the second question—whether the text of the
advertisement may contain what amounts to an endorsement by the church—
the IRS is more clear. The text of the Revenue Ruling, taken as a whole,
strongly implies that the material question is whether campaign-related
speech may be attributed to the organization, not only whether it was funded
by the organization.144 Situations 3 and 5—each of which describes the
circumstances in which the speech of an organizational leader will constitute
a violation of the prohibition by the organization—lend support to the view
that a violation occurs when such leaders make remarks that can be attributed
to the organization. For example, Situation 5 describes a statement that the
140

Id. at 177.
See id. (“[The same] considerations that prevent an IRC 501(c)(3) organization from
establishing a IRC 527 organization also apply to the relationship between the IRC 501(c)(3)
organization [and] the political campaign intervention of the IRC 501(c)(4) organization . . . .”).
142
The IRS has also taken the position that a 501(c)(3) organization may not constitute a
separate segregated fund under section 527 without violating the prohibition, since the
actions of the 527 fund will be attributed to the 501(c)(3) parent, even if all funds used for
communicating the position are raised and spent by the 527 fund. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,694, at 11–12 (Feb. 1, 1988) (noting that section 527 “further states that the
imposition of the section 527 tax and the ability to establish separate segregated funds do
‘not sanction the participation in these activities by section 501(c)(3) organizations.’ One of
the ‘activities’ that is not sanctioned is the establishment and maintenance of a separate
segregated fund by an organization described in section 501(c) where the separate segregated
fund conducts activities that the tax-exempt organization itself is barred from conducting
under the relevant subsection of section 501(c).”).
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IRS concludes does not implicate the organization. The Revenue Ruling
states that the statement does not violate the prohibition because the
organizational leader, a minister, “did not state that he was speaking as a
representative of [the] Church,” as well as the fact that the minister did not
make the statement at an official church function, in an official church
publication, or using the church’s assets.145 In other words, the key
determinant of whether a violation occurred is whether the views can be
attributed to the organization or not.
Situation 5 is especially material to the question of whether an
organization has an “alternate means” of communicating its own views on
candidates. In it, the minister is speaking at “a press conference at Candidate
V’s campaign headquarters.”146 If the organization were to have an alternate
means of communicating its own views on the candidate’s qualifications for
office, this is exactly the kind of scenario in which it should be permissible
to communicate such views. A press conference at the campaign headquarters
of the candidate is obviously not an official function of the church, and the
press that will communicate the statement will not do so in an official publication
of the church. This would be an ideal situation for the IRS to explain exactly how
an organization can use an alternate means of communicating its views on
candidates: it may do by sending an organizational leader to speak on behalf of
the organization at a press conference held at the candidate’s headquarters (or
really anywhere other than an official function of the organization or at some
event paid for by the organization). But the Revenue Ruling does not state that
such a communication would be permissible even if it was attributable to the
organization. Rather, it states that the statement is permissible, at least in part,
because the minister “did not state that he was speaking as a representative of”
the church.147
The logic behind the IRS’s position is not faulty. As discussed above,
when an organization endorses a candidate, it effectively makes use of tax145

Id. at 1422, 1424. Situation 3 is very similar to Situation 5. Situation 13 is also arguably
relevant. In that situation, the chairman of the board of a 501(c)(3) symphony speaks in favor
of a mayor running for re-election who is present at a free concert of the symphony in one
of the city’s public parks. Here, the question is whether the candidate’s appearance at the
concert constitutes campaign intervention, and the Revenue Ruling concludes that it does
because the chairman of the board communicated his support for the candidate at the event.
If a free concert at a public park is an “official function” of a symphony that performs there,
then the Revenue Ruling is consistent on that point without completely foreclosing any
alternate means for the symphony to communicate its views on the candidates. If it is not,
then this situation reinforces the position gleaned by the other situations—that any
communication that expresses a preference among candidates is forbidden if that
communication is attributable to the organization, whether such communication uses the
organization’s funds or not.
146
Id. at 1422.
147
Id. (emphasis added).
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deductible contributions, even if no incremental costs are incurred in
communicating that message. With regard to the money spent to build the
reputation of the organization, this is true even if the statement is made in a
third-party location, like at the campaign headquarters of the candidate. But
notwithstanding its logic, the IRS’s position renders the statutory scheme
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held in Regan that the organization
needs some alternate means to communicate its own views regarding the
qualifications of candidates, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the necessity of an
alternate means in Branch Ministries.148
So, where does that leave us? The law (as described by the Supreme
Court in Regan and reaffirmed by the D.C. Circuit Court in Branch
Ministries) requires that 501(c)(3) organizations have some mechanism to
communicate their views on candidates, even their express endorsements of
candidates, without violating the Johnson Amendment. The leading IRS
guidance on the matter seems to deny 501(c)(3) organizations any such
alternate means for communicating their views.149
B. What Must a Johnson Amendment Modification Include?
De minimis incremental expenditure solutions, like the FSFA,
obviously solve the constitutional defect by permitting so-called “no-cost”
political speech, which could include an express endorsement by a church or
other charity. But they go further than is required. They expressly adopt an
incrementalist way of measuring expenditures, and pronounce all speech or
action that does not require incremental expenditures “no-cost political
speech,” and therefore permissible. Nothing in the Constitution requires that
the cost of speech be defined using an incrementalist approach. All that is
required is that the Johnson Amendment permit some mechanism for charities
to engage in partisan electoral speech without an undue burden. This Section
describes the narrowest possible approach to satisfy the constitutional
requirements described by the Supreme Court in Regan and applied to
campaign speech in Branch Ministries.
The narrowest modification sufficient to satisfy constitutional
concerns would do at least three things. First, it would affirm the fact that an
organization has a right to develop and state its own view about the
qualifications of candidates for public office. This view could include an
express endorsement of a candidate, or an express statement that a candidate
does not reflect the values of the organization and therefore should be
defeated. Second, the modification would clearly state that the organization
148

Regan v. Tax’n With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 552–53 (1983); Branch
Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F. 3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
149
Thomas & Kindell, supra note 139, at 177.
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may use, at a very minimum, its own meetings of its leadership, including its
own board meetings, to develop its views and to take official action stating
such views. Third, it would affirm that the organization is permitted some
mechanism to communicate its official views to its members and to the
general public, even if reasonable restrictions may be placed on the ways that
it makes such communications. This Section describes these three minimal
requirements of IRS guidance.
1. The Johnson Amendment does not prohibit an organizational
express endorsement
The clearest violation of the Johnson Amendment under the IRS’s
interpretation is when an organization expressly endorses a candidate. Many
proposals for reform of the Amendment have preserved this restriction,
carving out space for an organization (or its leaders) to speak relatively freely
about candidates, so long as they do not cross the putatively bright line of
endorsement.150 As discussed above, there is good reason—because of the
plain language of the statutory text, the additional elaboration in the Treasury
Regulations, and legitimate inferences from the plausible intent of the
statute—to argue that the prohibition does and should prohibit express
endorsements. Nonetheless, I cannot imagine how the Regan case can be
squared with that circle. It states clearly that a 501(c)(3) organization has a
constitutional right to engage in Constitutionally-protected political speech,
and that governmental regulation of that speech only successfully avoids a
substantial burden on that right if it ensures that the organization has an
alternate means of communicating its views. It is not permissible for the
government to offer organizations 501(c)(3) status conditional on them giving
up their First Amendment rights. It is not sufficient to say that a 501(c)(3)
organization is free to forego such status in order to engage in such speech. It
must be able to retain its 501(c)(3) status for all of its proper charitable
purposes, and still have an alternate means of communicating its views.151
There is nothing in Regan to suggest that an express endorsement
could properly be distinguished from other speech that implied an
endorsement. Furthermore, there is nothing in Regan to support the view that
the government is free to place restrictions on an express endorsement so long
as the organization is free to communicate about issues.

See, e.g., Samansky, supra note 51, at 153 (“I recommend that churches not be able to officially
endorse candidates and still retain their status as section 501(c)(3) organizations . . . .”).
151
See discussion supra Section III.A.
150
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2. The Johnson Amendment does not prohibit the adoption of a
resolution about candidates at a board meeting
If Regan protects an organization’s right to speak about a candidate’s
qualifications, including endorsing a candidate, then the organization needs
to have some mechanism to develop and solidify those views. Of course, an
organizational leader could communicate what she thinks the views of the
organization are or should be without direct board approval. I know of no
doctrine of nonprofit law that prevents organizational leaders who are broadly
authorized to act on behalf of the organization from stating the organization’s
views. But the most authoritative way for an organization to act is through its
board of directors.152 They have ultimate authority for the actions of the
organization, and they have ultimate authority to speak in its name. The most
authoritative way for a board of directors to act in the name of an organization
is through a resolution adopted at a properly constituted meeting. Therefore,
it follows from pure common sense that the authority of an organization to
speak and express its views must include the authority of the organization to
debate those views in a properly constituted meeting of its directors, and to
adopt a resolution at such a meeting expressing the organization’s views. As
Justice Blackmun stated in his concurrence in Regan, “It hardly answers one
person’s objection to a restriction on his speech that another person, outside
his control, may speak for him.”153 The person is the organization. The most
authoritative way that a corporate person can speak is through its board of
directors. Therefore, the board must be free to debate the organization’s
position and adopt a resolution stating its views.
An adequately revised Johnson Amendment must at a minimum state
that the board of directors, acting at a properly authorized meeting, has the
right to adopt a resolution stating the organization’s views on the
qualifications of candidates for public office, including adopting an express
endorsement of one or more candidates. As discussed above, Rev. Rul. 200741 does not explicitly state that such actions are prohibited, but can fairly be
read to imply it, since it prohibits campaign-intervention speech at “official
functions” of the organization, which a board meeting presumably is.
3. The Johnson Amendment must permit some mechanism for
communicating the organization’s views on candidates
According to Regan, it is not enough for the organization to have
political views and to be free to form those views, it must be permitted some
152

See, e.g., BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 5.6(a) (12th
ed. 2019) (discussing nonprofit governance principles).
153
Regan, 461 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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mechanism to communicate those views. This principle is the one that most
clearly violates current law and interpretation of the Johnson Amendment,
since the statute says explicitly that an organization cannot intervene,
“including the publishing or distributing of statements,”154 and the Treasury
Regulations expand that concept by stating that campaign-intervention
speech includes, “the publication or distribution of written or printed
statements or the making of oral statements on behalf of or in opposition to
such a candidate.”155 But whatever form a modification of the Johnson
Amendment takes, it will need to provide a mechanism for the organization
to communicate its message if it is to conform to the requirements described
by Justice Blackmun in Regan. As he stated, “[i]t must be remembered that §
501(c)(3) organizations retain their constitutional right to speak and to
petition the Government.”156 One cannot rightly be said to “speak” if all
means of communication—“publishing and distributing of statements” as
well as “the making of oral statements”—are prohibited. In addition to
making clear that an organization is free to discuss the qualifications of
candidates at its board meeting and adopt a resolution expressly endorsing
one or more candidates, a revised Johnson Amendment must make clear that
the organization is free to use some method to communicate its views to its
members and others.
Of course, the government has a legitimate interest in nonsubvention
and protecting the integrity of the campaign finance regulatory regime. That
interest includes preventing 501(c)(3) organizations from using their own
money—money that includes tax-deductible contributions—to communicate
campaign-related speech to the world. Most (or even all) organizational speech
includes the expenditure of some funds for the reasons described above.157
Therefore, a modification of the Johnson Amendment can carve out a narrow
exception to the general rule that organizations cannot “speak” about campaignrelated matters. It can prohibit a wide range of activities that are plausibly speech
in an effort to prevent institutional funds from being diverted to campaignintervention activities. But it must provide some avenue for the organization to
communicate its views on candidates.
The mechanism envisioned in Regan and Branch Ministries—
referred to as an “alternate means”—is that the organization would cause the
154

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)-1.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(iii) (1995) (as amended in 2017) (emphasis added).
156
Regan, 461 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
157
As discussed supra note 29, an excise tax applies to such expenditures, but it has generally
been the assumption of most commentators that the measurement of such expenditures
should be calculated based on “marginal” or “incremental” cost. This assumption results in
the conclusion that the excise tax is not very effective to restrict speech by organizational
leaders at official functions. See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 15, at 652 (“If the political campaign
intervention involves little out of pocket expense, the excise tax has little bite.”).
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creation of an affiliated 501(c)(4) organization, which would then
communicate the 501(c)(3) organization’s views.158 This particular alternate
means was forefront in the minds of the Justices in Regan because the
plaintiff in the case had formerly been organized in precisely that way.159 It
was an affiliated pair of organizations—one tax-exempt under section
501(c)(3), one under 501(c)(4)—that engaged in lobbying activity through
the 501(c)(4) affiliate.160 The organization changed its organizational
structure, shutting down the 50(c)(4) affiliate, in order to argue that the
Constitution protects the right of 501(c)(3) organizations to engage in
unlimited lobbying. It was obvious for the Court to suggest that the
organization would not be unduly burdened by returning to the structure it
once employed, since it once employed that structure with apparent ease. In
Branch Ministries, the D.C. Circuit applied the holding of Regan and argued
that a similar structure would permit the church to engage in campaign
intervention speech without an undue burden.161
Thus, it arguably would be permissible for the IRS to authorize the
use of that structure—affiliated 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations—as
the mechanism for a 501(c)(3) organization to communicate its views on
candidates, including endorsements. So long as the IRS made clear that the
organization’s views can include an express endorsement by the 501(c)(3)
organization, and that the organization is free to form those views at a
meeting of the board of directors (as discussed above), the IRS arguably
could mandate that any communication of those views to anyone other than
those people authorized to demand access to the resolutions of the
organization must be communicated through an affiliated 501(c)(4)
organization. If the IRS took this position, it would require 501(c)(3)
organizations to form and operate a 501(c)(4) organization as a prerequisite

158

This requirement that an organization have some alternate means of communicating its
views, presumably through an affiliated non-501(c)(3) organization, has sometimes been
called the “Alternate Channel Doctrine.” See, e.g., Miriam Galston, Campaign Speech and
Contextual Analysis, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 100, 114 (2007) (discussing the Court’s
analysis of a bifurcated 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizational arrangement).
159
Regan, 461 U.S. at 544.
160
Id.
161
The court appeared to be confused about the law that applies to 501(c)(4) organizations,
stating incorrectly that, “[a]lthough a section 501(c)(4) organization is also subject to the ban
on intervening in political campaigns, it may form a political action committee (“PAC”) that
would be free to participate in political campaigns.” Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d
137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). However, this confusion is not material to its
holding that the requirement that a 501(c)(3) organization form a 501(c)(4) affiliate is not
unduly burdensome on its expression of its constitutionally-protected speech rights.
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to communicating its views on candidates. This burden is not trivial, 162 but
the D.C. Circuit in Branch Ministries presumably believed that it is not
sufficiently burdensome to cause First Amendment concerns.163
But it makes much more sense for a modification of the Johnson
Amendment to permit the communication of partisan electoral speech by an
organizational leader in some form that balances the organization’s right to
and interest in political speech with the concerns of the nonsubvention
principle without necessarily requiring the creation of an affiliated 501(c)(4)
organization. In other words, it makes perfect sense to permit an
organizational leader, like a minister, to communicate partisan views in an
official organizational meeting, like a worship service. It also makes perfect
sense, and is completely permissible, to limit those communications in ways
that prevent too much violation of the nonsubvention doctrine and reduce the
impact of such speech on the integrity of the campaign finance system. It
makes sense to permit pulpit speech; but it also is permissible to limit the
impact of the dissemination of such speech even if such dissemination does
not involve incremental expenditures.
The primary reason for expressly permitting organizational leaders to
speak on behalf of the organization at official functions is that such speech
seems so central to what some organizations do. Religious and educational
organizations have long viewed themselves as essential to the development
of values-rich communities, and this view has been affirmed again and again
over the course of American history. 164 Some of these organizations view
162

A 501(c)(4) organization cannot be formed primarily for the purpose of engaging in
campaign intervention, but rather must be organized and operated for some purpose that
advances social welfare. So, the burden is not just creating a separate organization and
maintaining separate books and records but engaging in social welfare activities to a
sufficient degree that the organization qualifies for tax-exempt status under 501(c)(4).
163
There are scholars who argue that the Supreme Court narrowed its view of what
constitutes an undue burden on speech in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). See,
e.g., Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and Wisconsin
Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?, 13 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 867, 899–901 (2011) (arguing that the Citizens United Court intended to
limit its concept of corruption to quid pro quo corruption rather than access or influence);
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobbying: Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens
United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 407, 423 (2011) (arguing that Citizens United suggests there must
be a minimal burden on the ability of an organization to speak using non-subsidized funds if
strict scrutiny applies). After Citizens United, the Supreme Court might be more sensitive to
burdens placed on partisan electoral speech than it was when it decided Regan, but a full
discussion of that issue is well beyond the scope of this Article.
164
See CAPRO REPORT, supra note 18, at 17 (“[M]any 501(c)(3) organizations have as their
core purposes making a difference in major social and moral conditions.”); see also Richard
W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV.
771, 780 (2001) (“[O]ur history, traditions, and interminable public debates on the social issues
are and have always been awash in religious expression, argument, and activism.”)
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politics as outside their proper sphere, but others see political action as an
essential component of the worldview that they teach.165 Communications
that take place at official organization functions may have a central role in
the organization’s ability to communicate their values to their members, and
therefore may seem almost sacred (or even literally sacred). When a pastor
or minister or priest or rabbi or imam speaks to their communities, their
freedom to speak about the values of their tradition is important to them and
their members. The idea of the government intervening in such
communications and shaping what the religious leader says appears
threatening to the core freedom of those organizations.166 The fact that pulpit
speech has been at the heart of resistance to the Johnson Amendment is not
an accident. It reflects deeply held beliefs about the meaning of religious
freedom and its association with what goes on between religious leaders and
members in a house of worship.
Because of this deep association—an association fostered by our
constitutional tradition—the government would do a lot to affirm the
independence of 501(c)(3) organizations if it permitted such speech. The
question is how could it do it without undermining the campaign finance
regime that does not permit a tax-deduction for campaign-related
contributions. Could a safe-harbor that is broad enough to include the speech
of organizational leaders to organizational members be narrow enough to
prevent the “flood gates” from being opened?
C. Analysis of Existing Proposals to Limit the Scope of a Johnson Amendment
Modification
Of the proposals examined in this paper, de minimis incremental
expenditure solutions, like the FSFA, modify the Johnson Amendment to
permit sufficient speech to meet Constitutional requirements. The FSFA and
similar proposals do not say anything explicit about permissible activities of
the board of directors, nor whether partisan electoral speech can be an
“official” endorsement of the organization. But the FSFA’s definition of “nocost” political speech is broad enough to include the components identified
165

See, e.g., Vaughn E. James, The African-American Church, Political Activity, and Tax
Exemption, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 395–96 (2007) (detailing the role of the church in
African American society as an agent of social change, a force of community involvement,
and a political institution).
166
E-mail from Mike Batts, Managing Partner, Batts Morrison Wales & Lee, to Paul
Streckfus, Editor, EO Tax Journal (Jul. 27, 2016), in Paul Streckfus, The EOTJ Mailbag, EO
TAX J. 2016-144 (“The content of a sermon or religious worship service embodies these [core
First Amendment] rights like virtually nothing else . . . . A law that permits US government
officials to monitor and evaluate the content of a minister’s sermons to determine whether
such content is permissible is inherently problematic. It is hard to imagine any law that is
more of an affront to the First Amendment.”).
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as necessary: (i) that it permits an express endorsement, (ii) that it permits a
governing body to deliberate and adopt a resolution at an official meeting,
and (iii) that it permits a mechanism for communicating its views. Indeed, the
problem with those solutions is that, in their effort to permit sufficient speech
to charities, they undervalue the nonsubvention principle, and in doing so
almost certainly will create a massive distortion of the campaign finance
system, as academic commentators have predicted.167
So, what about the proposals by academic commentators who seek to
provide alternatives that value the nonsubvention principle more fully than
incremental expenditure proposals like the FSFA? These alternative
proposals provide creative solutions, but in each case the proposal is too
narrow to adequately value the speech interests and rights and
constitutionally-protected speech rights of 501(c)(3) organizations. In some
cases the proposed solutions are also simultaneously too broad to adequately
vindicate the nonsubvention principle. What is needed is a solution that better
balances free speech interests and rights against the legitimate interest in
nonsubvention.
1. Proposals that maintain the status quo interpretation of
organizational speech for non-church 501(c)(3) organizations
insufficiently validate speech rights
First, any proposal that applies only to houses of worship does not
solve potential constitutional problems for other charities and fails to validate
the speech rights or interests of such non-church organizations.
Commentators like Zelinsky and Crimm & Winer, who propose a special
speech-friendly solution for houses of worship, emphasize the special role
that religious leaders have in communicating about the values and teachings
of their religious traditions, and how that role makes it especially necessary
to avoid government interference when such religious leaders feel morally
compelled to communicate partisan electoral messages to their members. 168
But organizations other than houses of worship also play a role in
constructing and maintaining the social and moral universe in which their
members live, and their leaders may feel equally compelled to communicate
to their members in ways that constitute partisan electoral speech. The
Constitution protects the speech rights of non-church charities as well as
churches, and so a solution that applies only to houses of worship will be
insufficiently protective of the speech rights and values of other charities.
167

See Colinvaux, supra note 14 (arguing that de minimis spending on campaign statements
will not inhibit a proliferation of political speech by charities).
168
See ZELINSKY, supra note 24, at 202 (arguing that church endorsements should not be
treated “differently from other internal church discussions”); CRIMM & WINER, supra note
24, at 337 (proposing solutions that only apply to houses of worship).
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There is also an argument that a solution that permits partisan
electoral speech by houses of worship, but not by any other charity, might
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by favoring
religious institutions over all other charities. 169 The CAPRO proposed a
neutral provision partially because of concerns about the constitutionality of
a church-only one, and partially to vindicate the speech rights of non-church
charities.170 This argument was apparently persuasive enough to convince
Congress to switch from a church-specific provision to a neutral one based
on the FSFA when it included a Johnson Amendment reform provision in the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.171 It is beyond the scope of this Article to
evaluate the arguments for or against an Establishment Clause challenge to a
church-specific Johnson Amendment reform, but they are substantial enough
at least to cause some commentators to argue that any modification of the
Johnson Amendment should apply equally to all 501(c)(3) organizations.
Professor Zelinsky proposes enforcing the Johnson Amendment as
currently interpreted against all secular 501(c)(3) organizations, and so his
proposed method for limiting the effect of relaxing the Johnson Amendment
for houses of worship fails to sufficiently protect the speech rights or values
of non-church charities.172 Crimm & Winer do not propose simply retaining
the Johnson Amendment as currently interpreted for all non-church charities.
Instead, they propose moving the prohibition on partisan electoral speech
from section 501(c)(3), where the penalty for violation is loss of tax-exempt
status, to section 170, where the penalty for an organization engaging in
partisan electoral speech would be loss of tax deduction for any contribution
to the organization in the year in which it violated the prohibition. 173
Professor Colinvaux also proposes moving the location of the Johnson
Amendment from section 501 to section 170, and he makes a more explicit
argument for why its placement in section 170 would be less likely to cause
constitutional speech concerns. Colinvaux argues that “denying an individual
or entity’s deduction for a contribution to an organization that engages in
political or lobbying activity has only an indirect effect on the speech, at best
. . . [and] merely reflects Congress’s decision not to subsidize speech.” 174
Colinvaux, like Crimm & Winer, proposes that a taxpayer who made a
169

For analysis of preferential treatment of religious charities over other charities in another
context, see, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, The Parsonage Exemption Violates the
Establishment Clause and Should Be Declared Unconstitutional, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 707,
726 (2003).
170
See CAPRO REPORT, supra note 18, at 28–30 (proposing a neutral provision).
171
See Aprill, supra note 5, at 5–6 (noting that the Ways and Means Committee switched to
a neutral provision potentially in response to constitutional objections).
172
See supra note 97.
173
See supra note 102.
174
Colinvaux, supra note 15, at 738.
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contribution to an organization that engaged in any campaign intervention
during the year at issue would be denied the tax deduction provided under
section 170.175 While it makes sense that moving the limitation from section
501 to section 170 “would require a distinct constitutional challenge,”176 a
rule that denies a deduction for a contribution for any purpose to an
organization that engaged in any campaign-interventions speech would be
just as constitutionally problematic as a rule that denies tax exemption to an
organization that engaged in any campaign-intervention speech. Both are
constitutionally problematic because the “penalty” for the organization
exercising its constitutionally-protected speech rights is not proportional.
Their donors lose the ability to make tax-deductible contributions for any
purpose when the offending speech may be very minor. The opportunity for
the organization to obtain tax-deductible contributions for its charitable or
tax-exempt purposes is therefore offered only on the organization’s choice to
forego a constitutionally-protected right, which is at the heart of what
constitutes an unconstitutional condition, just the same as the choice of
whether to forego the exemption under section 501(c)(3).
2. Limitation to “internal” communications is better than to “no-cost”
communications, but will easily be abused
“Internal communications” limitations, like those proposed by
Zelinsky and Crimm & Winer, do a better job of reducing subsidized speech
by charities than de minimis solutions, but may well still permit substantial
abuse. At the same time, some constitutional questions may remain.
Remember, under Regan, the Constitution requires that a 501(c)(3)
organization be permitted (i) to have a view on the qualifications of
candidates, even if that view is in the form of an express endorsement, (ii) to
formulate that view, at the very least for organizational leaders like the board
of directors to be able to discuss the issue at an official board meeting, and
(iii) to have some mechanism to communicate its views. 177 Internalcommunications limitations appear to satisfy the first two requirements since
board meetings and other deliberative gatherings would presumably
constitute permissible internal communications. However, it is not clear
whether they satisfy the third requirement—that the organization be
permitted some mechanism to communicate its views. The right to
communicate the organizational view on candidates might be satisfied by
purely internal communications, but it might well be reasonable to understand
that right as including at least some mechanism to communicate that view to
175

Id.
Id. at 739.
177
See discussion supra Section III.B.
176
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external sources. That mechanism can be constrained to further the goals of
nonsubvention, but it is possible that altogether eradicating it would be
constitutionally impermissible. If some mechanism must be permitted, then
some of the restrictions proposed by Crimm & Winer, like their requirement
that 501(c)(3) organizations make it difficult to share a video externally of a
leader making an internal communication, would probably be constitutionally
permissible. On the other hand, a requirement that all members promise not to
share externally the organization’s internally communicated views in any way
would probably violate the organization’s constitutionally-protected speech
rights or those of its members.
More importantly, however, is the fact that any internalcommunication limitation is likely to be easily abused, and therefore is likely
insufficient to nonsubvention interests. Members’ ability to share any internal
communication through social media and candidates’ and independent
political committees’ ability to use unlimited advertising dollars to amplify
internal communications mean that an endorsement or other internal
communication of support is likely to have a wide public dissemination if it is
valuable to a candidate. Remember, a 501(c)(3) organization has used taxdeductible contributions to develop its credibility over many years, and therefore
its endorsement makes use of government-subsidized funds even if the
endorsement is transmitted by third parties. Because of the ready availability of
cheap speech, and because of the potential power of a second-hand delivery of
speech that is authentically associated with the organization, an internal
communications limitation advances the nonsubvention principle better than
a de minimis incremental expenditure solution, but still undervalues
nonsubvention principles.
3. Aprill’s disclosure proposal is promising, but likely to have little
effect
In her article on cheap political speech, Professor Aprill proposes a
different sort of mechanism to prevent abuse of any future loosening of the
Johnson Amendment. She proposes that charities that engage in campaign
speech be required to disclose any donors who do not explicitly prohibit the
organization to use their contributions for campaign speech. 178 This proposal
is promising because it does not rely solely on attempting to segregate the
cost of campaign speech. But it is plausible that its effect on campaign speech
will be limited for reasons described later in this article.179

178
179

Aprill, supra note 5, at 17.
See infra text accompanying notes 200–07.
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4. Brunson’s penalty proposal is promising but too limited
Finally, Professor Sam Brunson has made perhaps the most creative
proposal, but it has its limitations as well. 180 The most creative aspect of his
proposal is that it imposes a financial cost on donors to charities that engage
in campaign speech, but the cost is not based on the incremental cost of the
speech itself. Rather, the cost would be a percentage of the value of the tax
deduction received by each donor to the charity that year. Under Brunson’s
proposal, so-called low- or no-cost political speech (speech with no
incremental or marginal cost), could still generate a penalty that attempts to
reflect the nonsubvention principle. Here, classic no-cost political speech—
like support for a candidate expressed in an in-person worship setting—
would have a cost. A fraction would be calculated using the number of
people in the church that day as the numerator and the number of donors to
the church over the course of the year as the denominator, and that fraction
would be applied to all tax-deductible donations received by the church for
the year. So, as an example, if there were 100 people in the audience when
the communication was made and 200 people donated to the church over the
course of the year, the fraction would be 100/200 (50%). If one of those 200
donors made a donation of $100, they would get a letter at the end of the year
saying that the deduction derived from their donation would be reduced by 50%.
So, for example, if they were in the 25% marginal tax bracket, their tax impact
of their deduction would be reduced from $25 to $12.50. Every donor to the
organization over the course of the year would get a similar letter informing them
to file an amended return to reflect the reduced value of their deduction.
The key to the proposal is that the percentage of the deduction that is
taxed is calculated based on the size of the audience toward which the speech
is directed, not the cost of the communication. 181 If the size of the audience
to which the communication is directed is larger than the total number of
donors (which would result in a percentage over 100%), then the deduction
for any donations during the year is entirely disallowed. This proposal does
some things right because it avoids the problem of low-cost speech and
properly links the cost of making campaign speech to the existence of a
deduction for donations to charity, disallowing the deduction if the charity
is attempting to reach an audience that is significantly larger than its total
number of donors.
The problem with Brunson’s solution is the same problem as with all
of them: a charity can direct its message to a small number of insiders or even
a single person, who then is free to amplify the message by spreading it to
180

See Brunson, supra note 114, at 164 (arguing for a tax law that disallows a portion of
donors’ deduction to the public charity).
181
See supra discussion accompanying notes 114–23.
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others. In an age of cheap speech, a charity could communicate its
endorsement to one recipient, and that recipient could communicate that
endorsement to millions of others for free through social media. In addition,
in an age of unrestricted political spending, a recipient of the charity’s
endorsement could spend an unlimited amount of advertising dollars to
amplify and spread the charity’s message. Under Brunson’s proposal, the
charity would incur a cost based on only the communication to the first single
recipient because it would be unfair to penalize the charity for actions outside
of its control. Brunson fully acknowledges this problem but argues that it
would still likely have a significant effect. Its effect would come both by
providing a financial incentive for donors to attempt to prevent charities from
directing their campaign speech to a significant audience and, like Aprill’s
proposal, it forces charities to communicate to donors their intention to
engage in campaign speech.
IV. SO, HOW COULD THE JOHNSON AMENDMENT BETTER BALANCE
SPEECH RIGHTS WITH NONSUBVENTION?
A. Non-Incremental Expenditure Tax
Professor Brunson’s proposal for a tax based on audience-size rather
than incremental expenditure is an example of a non-incremental expenditure
financial penalty. It attempts to impose a financial penalty related to the value
of the tax deduction taken for contributions to charities in order to better
promote the nonsubvention principle in cases of so-called no-cost political
speech. As discussed above, as a financial penalty, it is probably too timid a
proposal to really promote nonsubvention because any recipient (including
presumably the minister themselves acting as a private person) could
immediately turn around and direct the speech to a much larger audience
without that second communication resulting in any additional penalty. 182
In 2009, I also proposed a non-incremental expenditure approach to
promote the nonsubvention principle, while still permitting charities some
mechanism for engaging in political campaign speech. 183 As I mentioned
above, I argued that incremental (which I then called marginal or de minimis)
expenditure solutions fail to fully prevent subvention because (i)
organizations can engage in speech without spending any incremental funds,
and (ii) an express or implied endorsement by an organization derives its
value from the credibility of the organization, which the organization has
spent funds for years to build up. 184 In order to more fully vindicate
See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 114, at 162 (“These tests can be gamed, of course.”).
See Leff, supra note 2, at 715–23 (proposing a model expenditure paradigm).
184
See supra discussion accompanying notes 73–76.
182
183
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nonsubvention values, I proposed two possible non-incremental methods for
assessing the cost of an organization’s campaign-related speech: (i) an
allocation method under which the cost of campaign-related speech includes
not only the incremental expense associated with the speech, but also some
allocation of “overhead” costs based on any reasonable method, 185 or (ii)
what I called a “Lump-Sum Safe Harbor Method” in which an organization
that engages in campaign-related speech treats a somewhat arbitrary 10% of
its total costs of operations in the current year as associated with that
speech.186 In that article, I argued that an organization should be prohibited
from spending any of its own money (money donated on a tax-deductible
basis) on campaign-intervention activity, requiring the organization to be
reimbursed for the cost of such activity—which included both any
incremental cost plus a proper allocation—by some person or organization
that does not deduct the reimbursement. 187 In other words, even if an
organization engages in so-called no-cost political speech, like when a
minister voices a preference for a candidate at a worship service, for the
purposes of the Johnson Amendment the “cost” of that speech would be
considered to include 10% of the church’s cost of operation for that year plus
an allocation of the minister’s salary. 188
While I am still persuaded by my reasoning in 2009, I see now that
the proposal I made then does not provide the basis for a workable solution
to the Johnson Amendment problem. But I do think that some nonincremental expenditure penalty could be adopted that would better serve the
nonsubvention principle than existing incremental expenditure proposals like
the FSFA. It would just have to be simpler and more administrable than the
solution I proposed in 2009, most importantly by replacing third-party
reimbursements with a simplified excise tax regime. 189 For example, imagine
185

See Leff, supra note 2, at 717–21 (supporting a reasonable method to allocate costs
between lobbying and nonlobbying activities).
186
See id. at 721–23 (describing an arbitrary method to account for funds expended to build
an organization’s credibility).
187
See id. at 711 (describing a simplified allocation mechanism in which 501(c)(3)
organizations can account and pay for campaign related speech).
188
See id. at 722 (outlining a basic mathematical formula that could accurately capture the
cost of political speech for a 501(c)(3) organization).
189
I.R.C. § 4955 already provides an excise tax regime that applies to “political
expenditures” by 501(c)(3) organizations, but this existing excise tax on campaign-related
speech is unable to serve our purposes for at least two reasons: (i) there is currently no
guidance that applies a non-incremental expenditure approach to § 4955, and (ii) the tax
under § 4955 starts as a relatively modest deterrent to campaign spending by a charity (10%
of the expenditure). I.R.C. § 4955(a)(1). However, it then increases in a variety of ways that
would make the application of the tax to constitutionally-protected speech problematic. For
example, there is a tax on each “organization manager” who willfully permits the speech
equal to 2.5% of the expenditure. Id. § 4955(a)(2). In addition, the tax increases to 100% of
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a new tax that had the purpose of accounting for costs of campaign
intervention other than incremental costs. This non-incremental tax could
supplement a solution that prohibits any incremental expenditures by
501(c)(3) organizations, like the one proposed in the FSFA. So, Congress
would adopt the FSFA, but with respect to so-called “no-cost political
speech,” it would impose a new campaign-speech tax. If a 501(c)(3)
organization made an incremental expenditure for campaign activities (like a
donation to a campaign), it would lose its tax exemption. But, if it engaged
in so-called no-cost political speech, it would merely pay a tax that is
designed to vindicate nonsubvention principles, and no more. The design of
the new excise tax would be important because it would have to be both
simple enough for a 501(c)(3) organization to comply with the law without
an undue burden, and robust enough to vindicate the nonsubvention
principles without going too far.
The tax would be designed to reflect the fact that the use of taxdeductible contributions for political campaign activities creates subvention
by permitting donors, in effect, to influence campaigns with before-tax
dollars. Therefore, the tax rate should be roughly equal to the benefit received
by donors who deduct their donations. The problem with creating such a rate,
of course, is the wide range of tax benefits received by charitable donors. At
one extreme, some donors do not deduct their donations at all, and so they do
not receive any financial benefit from their donation. Taxpayers who do
deduct their charitable contributions receive a benefit at their marginal
income tax rate, which varies under current law from 10% to 37%. 190 To
complicate things even more, 501(c)(3) organizations are also exempt from
the corporate tax, and so any investment income that the organization earned
avoids tax at the corporate rate, which was 35% until the TCJA recently

the expenditure (and 50% on each organizational manager) if the expenditure is not
“corrected” within a set period of time. Id. § 4955(b)(1)–(2). An organization “corrects” the
expenditure by “recovering part or all of the expenditure to the extent recovery is possible,
[establishing] safeguards to prevent future political expenditures, and where full recovery is
not possible, [and] such additional corrective action as is prescribed by the Secretary by
regulations.” Id. § 4955(f)(3). Obviously, this tax’s purpose is to prevent an organization
from making a campaign-related expenditure, not to protect the nonsubvention principle
while permitting an organization to engage in constitutionally-protected speech.
190
See I.R.C. § 170. In addition to the deduction of the value of their contribution, taxpayers
who donate appreciated assets get a tax deduction for the full value of the property and avoid
the capital gains tax, which might be 0%, 15 %, or 20%. When that double benefit is taken
into account, a donation may save a taxpayer as much as almost 57% of their donation as
compared to selling the appreciated asset. Furthermore, a taxpayer who makes a charitable
contribution at death may save the estate tax, which is as high as 40%, although this tax
applies to only a tiny fraction of all decedent taxpayers.
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reduced it to 21%.191 Given all that complication, it would be impossible to
choose a rate that actually equalizes the benefit received by donors. Some
somewhat arbitrary rate would have to be chosen for simplicity’s sake and this
rate would underserve the nonsubvention principle for some taxpayers and
over-serve it for others. I could see proposing a tax at the corporate rate
(currently 21%), although I believe a rate set at the top individual rate
(currently 37%) would also be justified. Either would be simple enough to
administer while also being tied strongly to the principle of nonsubvention to
avoid claims that they were arbitrary in a constitutional sense.
Even more uncertain than what rate should apply would be how to
identify the base of the tax in a simple enough way. A tax “base” is the
number by which the “rate” is multiplied by to determine how much tax is
owed. In 2009, I proposed a “base” that equaled 10% of the organization’s
“total cost of operations” for the year. 192 In other words, one would recognize
that in some way all of an organization’s expenditures serve to build that
organization’s credibility, influence, and audience. Therefore, to the degree
to which all of the organization’s expenditures have been subsidized with taxdeductible contributions and tax-exempt income, they are the proper base for
the tax. But, of course, the expenditures are not only spent to build credibility,
influence, and audience. They also advance the organization’s tax-exempt
mission. Therefore, some fraction must be chosen. In 2009, I chose 10% and
I see no reason to modify that choice now.193
The point of this discussion is to argue that the fact that observers
have generally used an incremental-expenditure approach to understand the
cost of political campaign speech does not prevent Congress from using a more
accurate non-incremental measurement. Because of the existence of so-called
“no-cost political speech”—which has no cost only because of an incremental
191

In 2004, a provision was included in a version of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,
which as far as I know is the only non-incremental expenditure tax on 501(c)(3)
organizations that engage in campaign-related speech ever proposed. See H.R. 4520, 108th
Cong. § 692 (as introduced in the House, June 4, 2004) (imposing a tax equal to the highest
rate of tax specified by section 11(b) on the gross income of the organization for that calendar
year). At the time of the proposal, the applicable rate was 35%, although it is now 21%.
I.R.C. § 11(b). The provision was removed from the bill with no explanation by the time the
bill was “reported” in the house on June 16th, less than two weeks later. As far as I know, it
never subsequently made its way into any bill. [Thanks to Ripple Weistling for research
assistance relating to this provision.] That provision would also be insufficient for our
purposes, since it maintains a revocation of tax-exempt status if the organization engages in
campaign-related speech on more than three occasions and the penalty does not apply if the
speech “constitutes an intentional disregard by such organization or any of its religious
leaders of the prohibition of such activity under subsection (c)(3).” H.R. 4520 § 692(a).
192
See Leff, supra note 2, at 722 (noting that the concept of “total cost of operation” is
derived from Treas. Reg. § 1.162-28(d)(4) (1995), which describes the “ratio method” for
allocating costs to “lobbying activities” for the purposes of I.R.C. 162(e)(1)).
193
Id.
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method for measuring cost—the nonsubvention principle is underserved by
any tax on political campaign speech that uses an incremental approach. A
tax on political campaign speech that better serves the nonsubvention
principle could be devised, and I have presented an example of one.
B. Non-Expenditure-Based Approaches
Just because the current proposals to revise the Johnson Amendment
are either too broad (FSFA, etc.) or fail to solve the underlying constitutional
infirmity in the status quo interpretation, that does not mean that there is no
constitutionally adequate solution that also protects the integrity of the
campaign finance system better than the FSFA. In the prior Section, I
described a possible way to provide an expenditure-based tax to better serve
the goal of nonsubvention, while still fully recognizing an organization’s
right to expression. In this Section, I discuss three types of mechanisms that
could be added to a revised Johnson Amendment that would more strongly
protect the integrity of the campaign finance system than solutions like the
FSFA would. These non-expenditure-based solutions could be imposed to
supplement either an incrementalist expenditure approach (like the FSFA) or
a non-incrementalist expenditure approach (like the one described in the prior
Section). First, there are “reporting” solutions, in which charities are required
to report certain information to the IRS when they exercise their right to
engage in partisan electoral speech. Second, there are “disclosure” solutions,
in which the organization is required to report information to specific
stakeholders, or the general public, in order to engage in partisan political
speech. Finally, there are “governance” solutions, in which charities are
required to observe some procedural mechanisms to ensure that the
organization itself approves of it engaging in partisan electoral speech before
it or its leaders are permitted to speak on behalf of the organization. I treat
each type of mechanism in turn.
1. Reporting solutions
Reporting solutions are rules that require an organization to report
information related to partisan political speech to the IRS, or to some other
governmental agency. Reporting solutions are similar to disclosure solutions
(discussed in the next Section) because both require the organization to report
some kind of information, but the difference is that reporting solutions only
require the organization to communicate information to the government while
disclosure solutions require an organization to communicate information to
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someone else, either a specific stakeholder or the general public.194 The
difference between the two types of solutions is confused by the fact that the
primary forms on which charities report information to the IRS are the onetime Form 1023 and the annual Forms 990, and both of these forms are required
by law to be made public by the organization. Because of the requirement that
almost all information on Forms 1023 and 990 is disclosed to the public, it is
easy to confuse reporting with disclosure in the 501(c)(3) context. However,
there is a conceptual distinction between reporting and disclosure, and
therefore it is worth treating these types of solutions separately.
Reporting requirements for political campaign activity could include
the fact that the organization engaged in such activity, as well as some
information about the type of activity in which it engaged. The current Form
990 already contains a question that asks, “Did the organization engage in
direct or indirect political campaign activities on behalf of or in opposition
to candidates for public office?” 195 Under current law, a 501(c)(3)
organization that answers “yes” to this question is presumably conceding
that the organization has violated the law. 196 This question is broad enough
to cover any speech attributed to the organization that expresses a preference
for a candidate, including a favorable discussion of a candidate by a minister
in a worship service.
If an organization answers “yes” to the question about political
campaign activities, it is then required to answer a series of other questions
that appear on Schedule C Part I of Form 990, which asks for details about
the activity. Part 1-A has only three questions, asking for (i) a description of
political campaign activities, (ii) an assessment of political campaign activity
expenditures, and (iii) an assessment of volunteer hours for political
campaign activity.197 For 501(c)(3) organizations, since political campaign
activities are expressly prohibited under current law, the answers to all of
these questions presumably constitute an organization’s admission of
improper activity, to be accompanied either by an attempt to “correct” their
error, or an invitation to the IRS for enforcement action.198
194

Some states have sought to have the IRS report donor information to state agencies that
oversee nonprofits within their jurisdiction, but such attempts have been controversial. See
Mayer, supra note 98, at 219 (noting actions by some states to require charitable organizations
“to submit their IRS-required donor lists to the state agency that oversees such organizations”).
195
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB NO. 1545-0047, FORM 990 R ETURN OF ORGANIZATION
EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 3 (2020).
196
See discussion supra Section I.
197
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB NO. 1545-0047, FORM 990 SCHEDULE C POLITICAL
CAMPAIGN AND LOBBYING ACTIVITIES 1 (2019).
198
For a discussion expressing surprise that the “Pulpit Freedom Sunday” protesters do not
use the Form 1023 to get their claims into court against the IRS, see Benjamin Leff, If
Churches Really Want to Vindicate Their Right to Endorse a Candidate It’s Easy for Them
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However, if the law were changed to permit so-called no-cost political
communications, the questions might still serve a purpose—or other
questions might have a purpose. Since this Section is about “reporting” but
not “disclosure,” we will imagine that the questions appear on a schedule that
the organization is not required to disclose to the general public. What might
be the benefits of requiring reporting of (i) the fact of political campaign
activity, (ii) a description of the activity, (iii) an accounting of the cost of the
activity, and (iv) an accounting of volunteer hours devoted to the activity?
The most obvious purpose of a reporting requirement is that it enables the
IRS to enforce the law. In most cases, the IRS seeks information so it can
make a determination of which taxpayers to investigate further. In this case,
however, the reporting requirement might be used for the opposite purpose:
to provide a safe harbor against enforcement by the IRS, at least when the
campaign activity is within permissible bounds or not far outside them. Since
the definition of Johnson Amendment activities is potentially confusing and
inherently ambiguous, it would serve both the IRS’s and charities’ interests
to avoid enforcement except when really necessary. If Congress created a
stand-alone penalty for failure to report campaign activity, and then the IRS
took a hands-off approach to enforcement of relatively minor infractions so
long as they were reported, then charities would be encouraged to report their
electoral campaign activity without fear of adverse consequences from the
IRS. Failure to report, on the other hand, would result in penalties.
If reporting was required and the IRS did not use that reporting to
enforce the Johnson Amendment, then what purpose is served by a reporting
regime? The most important purpose for reporting, other than IRS
enforcement of the law, is that asking a question on a Form 990 triggers an
internal process for the organization subject to the question. The organization
must develop some internal procedure to be sure that it has the information
required by whoever is filling out the form (usually a tax accountant, but not
always). The Form 990 asks whether the organization has a policy that the
Form 990 is shared with each member of the board of directors before it is
filed, and it is considered a best practice for all board members to review it. 199
Therefore, asking about political campaign activity should have the effect of
to Get Into Court, SURLY SUBGROUP BLOG (July 28, 2016), https://surlysubgroup.com/
2016/07/28/if-churches-really-want-to-vindicate-their-right-to-endorse-a-candidate-its-easyfor-them-to-get-into-court/ [https://perma.cc/T33B-ZG65] (“This is often presented as a
dilemma for the churches: they want to get in to court, and are disappointed that the IRS
won’t let them. To me, this public stance on the part of the churches and Alliance Defending
Freedom seems disingenuous.”). See also Mayer, supra note 98, at 211 (“Interestingly, there also
appears to be a reluctance on the part of ADF to bring this issue to the courts, as ADF could force
a court resolution by causing a new church to be created and to file . . . for § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt
status while revealing its plans to support or oppose candidates from the pulpit.”).
199
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB NO. 1545-0047, FORM 990 R ETURN OF ORGANIZATION
EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 6 (2020).
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(1) requiring the organization to be more conscious of whether and when it is
engaging in such activity, and (2) communicating at least to its board of
directors whether it is engaging in such activity or not. Obviously, many
organizations may still engage in such activity without that information
appearing on the Form 990, but a modest penalty for unreported activity
should at least encourage some due diligence in those preparing such returns.
It is probably the case that the existing questions on the current Form
990 are sufficient to serve as a catalyst for internal processes that will at least
make an organization more conscious of the ways in which it engages in
political campaign activities, and perhaps choose not to do so unless its
stakeholders approve such action. If legislation were passed to permit some
sort of so-called “no-cost” political campaign activities by 501(c)(3)
organizations, the reporting provision could be used to encourage
organizations to go through a deliberative internal process for political
campaign activities, even if such activities were permitted because they met
the definition of “no-cost” speech. It would be essential for the IRS to
communicate that no-cost political campaign activity, however it is defined
in the statute, is still political campaign activity for reporting purposes. So,
even permitted activity must be reported. Otherwise, the reporting provisions
will have little effect. It is likely that such a provision will only be effective
if some penalty is imposed for unreported political campaign activity, even if
that activity is permitted under the revised law.
2. Disclosure solutions
The second mechanism for limiting the impact of permitting
organizations to engage in partisan electoral speech is to require disclosure
from them. In the corporate context, scholars have called for disclosure of
political spending by business corporations for many of the same reasons that
disclosure might be warranted for charitable organizations. 200 I can think of
two distinct types of disclosure that might be effective at limiting the impact
of a looser Johnson Amendment. First, the IRS could require that any
organization that engages in partisan electoral speech communicate that fact
and certain information about the activity to its stakeholders. Second, the IRS
could require that any organization that engages in partisan electoral speech
disclose the names of its donors to the general public. These two types of

200

See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political
Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 926–27 (2013) (arguing that SEC rulemaking requires public
companies to disclose their political spending). See generally DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175,
111th Cong. (2010); S. 3628, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing public disclosure requirements
for individuals, entities, and special interest groups who make electioneering donations to
specific candidates or political organizations).
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disclosure requirements are quite different from each other, and may advance
distinct interests in different ways.
a. Disclosure of the fact of, and information about,
political campaign activity
First, the IRS could require that any organization that engages in
partisan electoral speech be required to disclose that fact to its stakeholders.
This could be accomplished simply by keeping the Form 990 questions
described above in the portion of the 990 that is disclosed to the general
public. But because Forms 990 often are not disclosed until months or even
years after the described activity, one could imagine a more timely and robust
disclosure requirement, for example requiring organizations to post
information on their website (if they have one) or to send notifications to all
members or other stakeholders. These more robust disclosure requirements
would be more burdensome on the organization and so would need to be
accompanied by a strong justification for their value.
Donors are important stakeholders for many charities. Under current
law, organizations are required to provide certain information to all donors,
and donors are required to obtain that information as a condition of obtaining
a deduction on their Federal Income Tax. 201 It would be relatively easy to add
a requirement to the current donor acknowledgement form that addresses
political campaign speech. If that were the case, it would probably be best to
keep the communication simple, something like: “This organization has
engaged in political campaign activity within the past year.”
The arguments in favor of disclosure are similar to those regarding
reporting, but they take into account the interests of stakeholders other than
the government and those persons directly involved in preparing or approving
the Form 990. In other words, disclosure requirements recognize that donors,
funders, employees, contractors, beneficiaries, members, parishioners,
students, faculty, and even the general public have an interest in knowing that
an organization they are associated with is engaging in political campaign
activity.202 Based on that knowledge, they may choose to increase or affirm
their connection to the organization or to decrease or sever their association.
Donors may choose to donate based on the organization’s political campaign
activity or choose to refrain from donating. Remember, the information that
would be disclosed is presumably the organization’s understanding that it is
201

See I.R.C. § 170(f)(8) (mandating that a tax deduction over $250 must be substantiated
by a “contemporaneous written acknowledgment of the contribution by the donee
organization.”).
202
See, e.g., DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3628, 111th Cong. (2010)
(proposing public disclosure requirements for individuals, entities, and special interest
groups who make electioneering donations to specific candidates or political organizations).
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engaging in permissible political campaign activity, abiding by whatever
restrictions are included in future legislation. If they were engaged in
impermissible activity and disclosed this, then the disclosure may result in
enforcement by the IRS.
Finally, if an organization is required to identify and disclose such
activity, even if it is permissible, the organization may be more deliberative
in choosing whether to engage in such activity. Disclosure gives stakeholders
an opportunity to attempt to influence the organization if they do not want it
to engage in political campaign activity. How effective that influence would
be would vary from organization to organization, of course.
b. Disclosure of donors
A very different type of disclosure would be if Congress required that
any organization that engages in political campaign activity be required to
disclose to the general public the names of its donors. As discussed above,
Professor Aprill has proposed a version of this requirement. 203 She suggests
“a radical approach—disclosure of donors, whether or not they itemize, to
section 501(c)(3) organizations unless they specify that their donations will
not be used for campaign intervention or for lobbying.”204 She argues that
such disclosure serves the same purposes as disclosure of political campaign
contributors in other legal contexts:
[P]rompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders
and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations
and elected officials accountable for their positions and
supporters . . . . The First Amendment protects political
speech, and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to
react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.205
Unfortunately, a donor disclosure provision, like the one proposed by
Aprill, is likely to be less effective than disclosure in the business corporation
context for a variety of reasons.206 Disclosure of all donors to an organization
that engages in political campaign speech would advance some of the same
purposes as disclosure of the fact of the corporation’s speech, but not
203

See Aprill, supra note 5, at 16 (proposing a rule requiring 501(c)(3) organizations disclose
their donors unless said donors specified that their contributions are not to be used for
campaign intervention or lobbying).
204
Id.
205
Id. (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010)).
206
See, e.g., David Earley, DISCLOSE Act Crucial to Transparency of Federal Election
Spending, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 23, 2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysis-opinion/disclose-act-crucial-transparency-federal-election-spending [https://
perma.cc/GX27-NM3Y] (analyzing the effects the DISCLOSE Act would have on
organizations if they were required to disclose their donors).
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others.207 For example, to the degree to which the goal of disclosure is to
permit citizens to “see whether elected officials are ‘in the pocket’ of socalled moneyed interests,”208 it is not clear how a disclosure of a long list of
donors to a 501(c)(3) organization would do that effectively. The donors may
have very diverse interests, and the fact that the organization endorsed or
otherwise supported a candidate is probably weak evidence that the candidate
is “in the pocket” of all or any of the donors. If the goal is to enable
stakeholders to hold an organization accountable for its political campaign
speech, then it is not entirely clear why the stakeholders need to see a list of
the names of the donors. It is plausible that a list of donors that contained
amounts of their donation would be relevant, since both stakeholders and
citizens could then see if an organization is dominated by a small number of
donors, and that information might be relevant to fully understand the
political interests of the organization. But absent the magnitude of the
donation, it is not clear what the mere list of names provides.
Most damaging to the efficacy of a donor disclosure provision like
the one proposed by Aprill is the limitation that donors’ names are disclosed
“unless they specify that their donations will not be used for campaign
intervention or lobbying.”209 The problem with this limitation is that it
plausibly renders the whole disclosure provision ineffective. Remember, the
point of non-expenditure-based regulation of political speech is that the
existence of low- or no-cost political speech means that an organization can
engage in quite effective campaign intervention without spending anything
(at least anything incremental). So, if donors can avoid having their names
disclosed simply by specifying that their donations cannot be used for
campaign intervention, there is not really any impediment to them preventing
their names from being disclosed. Arguably, a 501(c)(3) organization could
still engage in no-cost political campaign activity, if legislation were adopted
to permit such activity, even if every single one of its donors had specified
that their donation should not be so used. At worst, all it would take would
be one small donor willing to have their name disclosed to avoid the
disclosure regime for all the other donors. If all of the big-money donors were
not disclosed, and a few small dollar donors were, that would arguably
provide as little or even less information about who was influencing which
politician and vice versa than if there was no donor disclosure provision at
207

For a discussion of the policy objectives of corporate activity disclosure versus donor
disclosure in the context of state-level regulation of non-charitable nonprofit electoral
speech, see Linda Sugin, Politics, Disclosure, and State Law Solutions for 501(c)(4)
Organizations, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 895, 918–25 (2016) (arguing that disclosing
organizational spending in politics can achieve the policy goals of protecting the political
process, donors, and voters).
208
Aprill, supra note 5, at 16 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370).
209
Id. (emphasis added).
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all. Presumably, Aprill included the opt-out because she recognized that “out
of respect for individual liberty and privacy, nondisclosure of contributors to
exempt organizations . . . has long been a hallmark of our tax system.” 210
Therefore, requiring disclosure, but permitting nondisclosure of any donor
who specifies that their donation cannot be used for political activity, is a
compromise between two competing values. Unfortunately, in this case, it
renders the disclosure regime ineffectual.
One possible benefit of a donor disclosure regime is that it would
force donors to communicate with the organization about political campaign
activities. If the organization was required to disclose their donors’ names
unless the donor asked for their donations not to be used for political
campaign activities, then the organization would have to explain that
requirement to the donor and the donor would have the opportunity to express
their preferences to the organization. This communication might be
beneficial, but could be accomplished less controversially by a disclosure
regime designed to force the communication, as described above.
It is possible that the true purpose of a donor disclosure regime is to
simply disincentivize political campaign speech by charities. It is possible
that organizations know that their donors would prefer not to be disclosed, at
least in some cases, and so a regime that threatens disclosure, even with an
ability to opt out, will cause organizations to choose not to engage in political
campaign speech to avoid upsetting their donors. To the degree to which a
donor disclosure regime is intended to decrease such activity without being
designed to advance legitimate governmental interests, it is presumably
constitutionally suspect and improper.
3. Governance solutions
Because a charity is by definition a complex entity, what it means for
it to “speak” is an inherently difficult question. This is because a charity, like
any corporation (which most charities are) can only act through its agents.
And no single one of its agents reliably acts on behalf of the organization all
the time.211 Therefore, it is not unreasonable to require that charities follow
some procedures to make sure that any speech, or specifically its partisan
electoral speech, is really its own. In other words, one could imagine imposing
some special rules relating to the governance of a charity that engages in
partisan electoral speech. This Section briefly addresses whether charities
should be subject to rules requiring them to follow specific governance
210
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procedures before engaging in partisan electoral speech, and the penalties that
could be applied for failure to follow those governance procedures.
Corporate law scholars proposed similar governance rules for
business corporations following the Citizens United case.212 Recognizing that
the separation of ownership and control in a corporation causes an “agency
problem,” these scholars argue that aligning the corporation’s political speech
with its shareholders’ will is a compelling government interest justifying special
governance rules that apply to corporations engaging in political speech. While
charities and business corporations differ because charities do not have
shareholders the way business corporations do, they do have stakeholders and
suffer from agency problems that are at least as severe as those that infect
business corporations.213 Given how important electoral speech is, and how
potentially closely tied it is to an organization’s core identity and mission, a
rule requiring that a charity properly expresses its own view, and not the
personal view of one or more of its agents, seems eminently justified. 214 A
concern for the First Amendment rights of charities should not create a
situation in which the government empowers the charity’s agents to speak on
its behalf without the proper consent of the charity. That does not make sense.
So, what type of procedural rules would best align an organization’s
speech with its intentions (and what type of penalties would be appropriate
to enforce such rules)? First of all, one could imagine requiring a charity’s
board of directors to approve any political speech made on behalf of the
organization. That would mean that a pastor could not endorse, or express
views—positive or negative—about a candidate from the pulpit unless the
church’s directors (or equivalent governing body) had expressly approved
such action. The organization’s board of directors could approve a leader
expressing the views using her own judgment about how to apply the
organization’s values to a choice among candidates without directing the
212
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leader which candidate to support. Or the board of directors could make a
decision itself about which candidate best advanced the values of the
organization. Or, of course, the board could expressly prohibit a leader from
expressing views that could be attributed to the organization, which would
presumably include expressing any views about candidates at an official
meeting of the organization (such as a worship service). The choice of what
the organization’s position would be with respect to electoral speech would
be up to the board of directors of the organization.215
While official board approval seems like an obvious first step, it might
be insufficient to protect the interests of the organization. Bebchuk & Jackson
argue that business corporations should be required to obtain shareholder
approval to spend any money on political speech, not merely the approval of
the directors.216 They also propose that shareholders should be empowered to
adopt resolutions about the manner or type of political action the corporation
may take, permitting shareholders to control corporate decision-making
about political spending beyond just approving the budget for such
activities.217 Both of these proposals seem appropriate for charities as much
as or more than for business corporations, except for the fact that charities do
not have shareholders. So, if there is to be a rule that some approval beyond
the board of directors would be required for a charity to engage in electoral
speech, then the first obvious question is: approval from whom? For some
charities, an obvious candidate for this role is the “members.” In most states,
nonprofit organizations are defined as either “membership” or
“nonmembership” organizations.218 A “member” in these states is anyone
who has the authority to elect or appoint the board of directors.219 These
members sometimes have authority to make specific important decisions on
behalf of the organization—their approval may be needed to change certain
provisions of the bylaws, or to dissolve the organization. 220 So, for
215
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organizations that have a membership in this sense, it would be natural if one
were looking for some authority beyond the board to approve political speech
to vest it in the membership. But most organizations do not have members in
this sense, and so a rule requiring members to approve political speech would
only impact a minority of organizations.
For many organizations, a suitable proxy for shareholders might be
some broader class of participants in the organization’s activities. These
participants might be internally considered “members” even though they do
not have the authority to elect the governing body, and so are not “members”
in the legal sense. For example, a church may have parishioners or other
“members” who are regular attendants and supporters. In some cases,
members may be required to pay dues as a prerequisite of membership, but
organizations may have a very wide range of mechanisms to define their
membership in this sense. One could imagine arguing that this constituency
should have the power to decide whether the organization engages in
electoral speech. Especially if legislation is adopted that prioritizes so-called
“internal communications,” one could imagine the same mechanism that
defines when an organizational communication is “internal” defining the
constituency that has the authority to decide if the organization will make
such internal electoral communications. 221 One could imagine adding to
legislation that permits “internal” communications simultaneously requiring
the organization to define a “membership” to which the organization can
make such internal communications and then requiring approval from that
membership in order to engage in electoral speech.
Finally, there is a strong argument that donors to charitable
organizations should be empowered to decide whether the organization
engages in electoral speech or not. There is an old principle of charitable trust
law that donors make donations to charitable organizations subject to the
restrictions found in the organizations’ organizing documents. Because
501(c)(3) organizations are prohibited from engaging in political campaign
activities under current law, every charitable organization that has been
recognized as exempt under 501(c)(3) has a statement in its governing
documents that the organization will not engage in such activities. Some of
those statements may be drafted skillfully enough that a change in law would
expand their permissible activities so they can engage in any type of political
speech that is permitted, but many will not be. Even if the language in an
organizing document is permissive, there is a strong argument that donors
have donated to organizations under an understanding that the organization
cannot engage in political campaign activities. Therefore, there is a strong
argument that an organization should obtain consent in some form from its
donors prior to engaging in any such conduct. That argument has nothing to
221
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do with subvention or fairness in campaign funding. It has to do with plain
old consumer protection of donors. Donors should be able to choose what
type of organization they are contributing to and organizations should not be
in the business of misleading them. Of course, any donor consent provision
will necessarily apply to current donors, and so will not correct any problem
with prior donors. A stronger provision would demand some sort of consent
from prior donors before an organization can change its position with respect
to political campaign activity. However, a provision that demanded consent
from prior donors would likely be too burdensome for most organizations to
follow, and so would have the effect of barring existing organizations from
engaging in political campaign activities, leaving the field entirely to those
new organizations created specifically to influence elections that
commentators like Professor Aprill are most concerned about. 222
However a governance provision is crafted, it will create the necessity
for an organization to make a clear decision whether to engage in political
campaign activities or not, and may well reduce ad hoc or unauthorized
expressions of electoral opinions. If those expressions of electoral opinions—
endorsements or implicit endorsements—are attributable to an organization in
any way, it is beneficial for them to actually be the opinions of the organization,
not of some or other agent of the organization. Any church or other organization
that values its pastor’s or other leader’s views about the qualifications of
candidates will presumably authorize those leaders to express those views as the
views of the organization. That right is arguably protected by the Constitution,
but the Constitution does not protect the right of an organization’s agent or agents
to express their own views as the views of the organization or in a context in
which the imprimatur of the organization is assumed.
CONCLUSION
So, how do we fix the Johnson Amendment? Obviously, the Johnson
Amendment only needs fixing if it is broken, and so a fix assumes that the
status quo is not sustainable. I believe that the status quo is not sustainable
because it unconstitutionally burdens the speech rights of charitable
organizations by prohibiting them from expressing their views on the
qualifications of candidates, without providing them with an adequate
alternate channel for expressing such views. I also believe that the Johnson
Amendment is broken because the partisan divide over the proper scope of
the provision has paralyzed the IRS and prevented it from adequately
enforcing the prohibition even against obviously improper activity. But I do
not think one needs to be convinced that the status quo is unconstitutional or
See Aprill, supra note 5, at 7 (“[T]he proposed legislation . . . encourages the
establishment of faux charities.”).
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inadequately enforced to believe that the Johnson Amendment needs to be
fixed. One might simply be concerned that the political forces gathering to
change the Johnson Amendment are getting closer and closer to their goal,
and that the fix they are proposing—a de minimis incremental cost approach
like the FSFA—is insufficiently protective of the nonsubvention principle.
Even if you believe that the status quo is sustainable as a policy matter, if you
think it will fail as a political matter, you might be interested in a better fix
than the leading proposal in Congress.
So, what are the parameters of a revised Johnson Amendment that
actually adequately balances the speech interests of charities against the
nonsubvention principle? First, it still prevents 501(c)(3) organizations from
merely serving as a pass-through for campaign contributions. That is, the first
job of the Johnson Amendment is to prevent incremental expenditures by a
501(c)(3) organization to political campaign organizations or for political
campaign activities. Those incremental expenditures obviously violate the
nonsubvention principle and should be prohibited. Second, it would impose a
financial cost to engaging in non-incremental expenditures—so-called “nocost” political speech. I’ve proposed an excise tax of 21% on a base of 10% of
the organization’s total operating costs for the year. That excise tax would
cover all of the no-cost political speech no matter how many times it occurred,
though it would not cover incremental expenditures. Third, some sort of
disclosure regime should be imposed to require 501(c)(3) organizations that
want to engage in political campaign activity to report that fact and information
about how they did it or plan to do it to their stakeholders and to the general
public. Finally, governance requirements should be imposed to make sure
that relevant stakeholders have consented to the organization’s exercise of its
speech rights prior to any political campaign activity taking place. I believe that
these four requirements are necessary to best balance the speech rights of
charitable organizations with the nonsubvention principle, and that they do a
better job of aligning policy with the interests of charities, their stakeholders, and
the common good than existing proposals that limit the scope of an incremental
approach by only permitting certain organizations (like houses of worship) or
certain communications (like internal communications).
I am not deluded enough to think that the political climate is such that
real compromise action by Congress or the IRS on this matter is possible at
the present moment. But I do harbor the faint hope that someday, perhaps
even in the near future, something in this Article could be useful to actors or
spectators seeking to steer a middle course between two poles of political
rhetoric that exaggerate the partisan divide on this issue.

